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THE FEDERAL INACTION COMMISSION
Glen Staszewski*
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes the establishment of a "Federal Inaction
Commission" (FIC). This new, independent agency would be charged with
investigating and reviewing the inaction of Executive Branch agencies and
reporting its findings and recommendations to elected officials and the public.
The FIC would provide many of the same benefits that would result from
increasing the availability ofjudicial review of non-enforcement decisions and
other regulatory inaction. At the same time, the FIC would be in a position to
minimize the practical disadvantages that have been identified with judicial
review of such decisions. Not only would the establishment of the FIC
therefore provide a more workable solution to the problem of agency inaction
than other commentators have offered, but the agency would also provide a
political solution to what the staunchest defenders of the status quo have
maintained is solely a "political" problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress routinely delegates broad authority to administrative agencies to
implement federal programs in the modem regulatory state. When agencies
make policy decisions pursuant to this authority, they can err by going too far
in either of two fundamentally different directions. On one hand, agencies can
implement their programs in an unduly aggressive fashion and potentially
exceed the scope of their statutory authority or engage in arbitrary
governmental action. By and large, the law does a pretty good job of dealing
with this concem-regulated persons who are adversely affected by final
agency action can typically obtain judicial review and invalidate governmental
decisions that are deemed arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law.
1
On the other hand, agencies can implement federal programs in an unduly
lenient fashion and potentially render arbitrary decisions by refusing to take
action that is authorized by statute.2 In contrast to challenged agency action,
federal courts are often reluctant to conduct meaningful judicial review of
agency inaction. For example, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts
lack subject matter jurisdiction over generalized grievances against Executive
Branch agencies based on their alleged failure to comply with the terms of
regulatory statutes, even when Congress has expressly authorized such
adjudication. 3  Similarly, the Court has held that administrative decisions
declining to take enforcement action are presumptively immune from judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4
Commentators have recognized that the current state of affairs is
problematic because it creates an unwarranted asymmetry between the legal
treatment of regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries. 5 Simply put,
1 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (providing that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law").
2 For a classic description of the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983).
3 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571, 578 (1992) (holding that, despite the existence
of a citizen-suit provision in the Endangered Species Act, the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not
suffer a concrete injury).
4 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
5 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1692 (2004) (claiming that nonreviewability and standing doctrines facilitate faction
because "[t]hey make it more likely that agencies will respond to private or political pressure rather than public
welfare by giving those typically harmed by agency action (i.e., regulated entities) more power to protest than
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regulated entities have access to legal relief when they challenge unduly
aggressive agency action, whereas regulatory beneficiaries do not have access
to legal relief when they allege that an agency has failed to implement its
statutory mandate. This asymmetry creates incentives for agencies to pay
more attention to the interests and perspectives of regulated entities-and to
ignore the views of regulatory beneficiaries-during the administrative
6process.
Critics of the status quo typically advocate some form of judicial review of
7non-enforcement decisions and other inaction by administrative agencies.
The idea is that if those decisions were subject to judicial review under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, agencies would be obligated to provide
reasoned explanations for their non-enforcement decisions and other inaction.
This obligation would, in turn, compel agencies to consider all of the relevant
interests and perspectives during their decision-making processes, in addition
to preventing arbitrary governmental action and securing a meaningful form of
democratic accountability. 8
those typically harmed by agency inaction (i.e., regulatory beneficiaries)"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170,
1194-95 (1993) (explaining that Lujan threatens to "create a legal regime in which only regulated firms have
standing to obtain judicial review of most broadly applicable agency actions" and that "[i]n a world in which
agencies can predict with confidence that every decision unfavorable to regulated firms will be subjected to
judicial review and that no decision unfavorable to unregulated firms is reviewable, they inevitably will begin
to act in accordance with this new incentive structure"); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 656, 666-67 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Inaction] (criticizing the Court's distinction between agency action and inaction in the modem regulatory state
and emphasizing that "the availability of review will often serve as an important constraint on regulators
during the decisionmaking process long before review actually comes into play" and that "[r]eview at the
behest of statutory beneficiaries may perform a critical function in ensuring against unduly lax enforcement
that would violate statutory requirements"); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article 117, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 188 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing?] ("The
rise of the regulatory state rendered the distinction between regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries a
conceptual anachronism, a relic of the Lochner period.").
6 See supra note 5. See also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 414-20 (2007) (explaining that the leading theories of the legitimacy
of the administrative state "suggest that whether regulatory beneficiaries can hold an agency accountable for
implementing a particular statutory program will depend on the ability of beneficiaries to invoke external
mechanisms of control," such as judicial review).
7 See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[R]efusals to enforce, like other agency
actions, are reviewable in the absence of a 'clear and convincing' congressional intent to the contrary .... );
Bressman, supra note 5, at 1693 ("[C]ourts generally should reject special rules for agency inaction and should
apply the same principles that apply to agency action.").
8 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MIN. L. REv. 1253, 1278-84 (2009)
(describing the value of requiring public officials in a democracy to give reasoned explanations for their
decisions).
2009]
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Critics of these reform proposals contend that enforcement decisions are a
political matter and, therefore, none of the judiciary's business.9 At the same
time, even the proponents of meaningful judicial review of agency inaction
acknowledge the serious practical difficulties such review would present.
10
Thus, as things currently stand, non-enforcement decisions and other forms of
regulatory inaction remain a serious problem in search of a workable solution.
This Article proposes the establishment of the "Federal Inaction
Commission" (FIC). This new, independent federal administrative agency
would be charged with (1) identifying policy areas in which Executive Branch
agencies have declined to exercise their delegated statutory authority; (2)
directing agencies to adopt sensible enforcement guidelines for implementing
their existing programs; (3) investigating and resolving complaints regarding
particular non-enforcement decisions; (4) securing reasoned explanations from
Executive Branch agencies for any perceived deficiencies in the foregoing
areas; (5) reporting to elected officials and the public on the nature and scope
of regulatory inaction by Executive Branch agencies; and (6) making
recommendations regarding budgetary matters and substantive legislation that
could alleviate perceived deficiencies.
The FIC would provide the same benefits that are expected to result from
judicial review of non-enforcement decisions and other inaction by
administrative agencies. At the same time, the FIC would be in a position to
minimize the practical disadvantages that would accompany judicial review of
administrative decisions of this nature. Not only would the FIC provide a
more workable solution to the problem of agency inaction than other
commentators have offered, but such an agency would also provide a political
solution to what the staunchest defenders of the status quo have maintained is
solely a "political" problem.
9 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24
Hous. L. REv. 97, 107 (1987) (justifying enforcement discretion and other nonreviewable exercises of
administrative discretion on the grounds that "the decisions are supposed to be political ones-made by
institutions whose managers change with each presidential election and which are under the constant political
pressure of the congressional authorization and appropriations processes").
10 See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689,
716 (1990) ("Even many observers who favor a narrow application of [Heckler v.] Chaney concede that the
managerial nature of agencies' decisions about how they can best deploy scarce resources warrants
considerable solicitude from the courts during judicial review.").
[Vol. 59
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I. THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY INACTION
There are two different worlds of modem administrative law. The first,
which is governed by the rule of law, imposes procedural obligations on
agencies and subjects most of their final decisions to judicial review. The
second, which is better characterized by its "lawful lawlessness,"1 1 is largely
devoid of procedural obligations or meaningful judicial review. This Part
explains that when agencies take action to implement their statutory mandates,
regulated entities are generally entitled to the protections of the first world of
administrative law. In contrast, regulatory beneficiaries who are adversely
affected by "agency inaction" are often relegated to the second world (or third
world?) of administrative law.12 As a result, agencies have powerful incentives
to give more weight to the interests and perspectives of regulated entities than
to the views of regulatory beneficiaries during the administrative process.
This is not merely an academic concern. The goals of modem regulatory
statutes simply cannot be achieved without administrative action to implement
and enforce their provisions. For example, in any area where Congress has
delegated broad authority to administrative agencies to promote public health
and safety or to protect the environment, regulatory inaction threatens to
undermine those goals with potentially devastating consequences. Scholars
have therefore sharply criticized the most recent Bush Administration for
failing to implement the Clear Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the federal
11 Cf Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the
Limits of Law, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) ("Decisions not to prosecute are instances of what
Sarat and Hussain... call 'lawful lawlessness'-actions that are legally authorized, but not legally regulated."
(citing Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the
Rhetoric ofSparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1307 (2004))).
12 Although the distinction between agency action and inaction is notoriously vague, this Article's use of
the term "agency inaction" refers to an agency's express or implied refusal to take action to implement its
statutory authority. As defined, agency inaction is a broad concept that potentially encompasses a wide variety
of (in)activities, including the refusal or failure to promulgate rules, initiate investigations, or take enforcement
action. Agency inaction could also extend, in principle, to relatively informal decisions such as the failure or
refusal to promulgate guidance documents or even to return a phone call. As this partial list suggests, some
forms of agency inaction are more problematic than others, and different forms of inaction might call for
different forms or levels of external review. This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive
taxonomy of the full range of agency inaction or its proper treatment in every context. The proposal that is set
forth above was, however, written with a few assumptions: (1) an unreasonable delay in taking certain action,
such as the initiation of rule making, would fall within the FIC's jurisdiction; (2) the FIC should otherwise
focus primarily on significant forms of agency inaction that are not subject to judicial review under existing
doctrine; and (3) the FIC would be expected to identify different types of agency inaction, determine which are
most problematic, and establish its own priorities accordingly. In effect, the FIC would become the nation's
leading expert on the scope and appropriate treatment of various types of agency inaction.
2009]
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Superfund Program in an adequate fashion.13  Moreover, some of the most
challenging problems currently facing our society could potentially have been
alleviated or avoided if agencies had exercised their existing legal authority in
a more proactive fashion. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has notoriously refused to take action to limit greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles despite its authority to do so under the Clean Air
Act. 14  Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly
failed to take any legal action to address a variety of abuses in the mutual fund
industry until the New York Attorney General's Office began putting pressure
on the industry.
15
Finally, structural flaws in the existing legal and political processes
predictably facilitate inaction of this nature. In this regard, one prominent
group of administrative law scholars has explained that "[un many ways, the
regulatory process provides the ideal setting for ...collusion between the
administration and corporate interests because there are numerous subtle and
quiet ways to scuttle regulatory protections even while the laws embodying
those protections remain in force. 16 Another respected commentator provided
the following explanation in response to the SEC's failure to take action
against the mutual fund industry prior to the financial crisis:
Deep down, what is at work here is less a formal policy of
accommodation than the habitual response of overworked
bureaucrats operating in an esoteric and insular field of law that the
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSWvE REGULATION, REGULATORY
UNDERKILL: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S INSIDIOUS DISMANTLING OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS (2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Underkill 503.
pdf See also Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), SUPERUND: BETTER FINANCIAL ASSURANCES AND
MORE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC
(2006) (Statement for the Record by John B. Stephenson, Director of Natural Resources and Environment,
providing testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Superfund and Waste Management, Committee on
Environment and Public Works). The Superfund Program is designed to facilitate the clean-up of toxic waste
sites and impose the costs of those efforts on responsible companies. See id. at 1.
14 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007) (explaining EPA's argument that even if it has
the authority to issue mandatory regulations to address climate change, it would be unwise to exercise that
authority).
15 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency 26-28 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009; N. Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-30, 2009) (forthcoming in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony Barkow & Rachel
Barkow eds.)), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1428934; John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction,
LEGAL AFFS., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 46. For a discussion of the potential application of this proposal to
independent agencies, such as the SEC, see infra note 110.
16 BUZBEE ET AL., supra note 13, at 1.
[Vol. 59
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public does not understand and that is dominated by a powerful lobby
playing the role of the 600-pound gorilla. Add to this mix a rapidly
revolving door between the SEC and private legal practice, and SEC
staffers tend to learn that, unless an issue has become high profile, it
is best not to rock the boat. Efforts to expand the law only gain a
staffer the reputation of a troublesome dissident and interfere with his
ability to return to private practice with an enhanced resume.
17
Because the SEC eventually took action in response to the work of the New
York Attorney General's Office, the same commentator concluded that
"[s]ome measure of regulatory competition may be necessary to protect the
public from the danger that federal agencies, even prestigious ones like the
SEC, may be captured or stalemated by interest groups and their lobbies. 18
This Article's proposal to establish the FIC would provide a measure of
"regulatory competition," and would therefore help to protect the public from
arbitrary regulatory inaction and promote the rule of law.
A. The Asymmetry in Administrative Law Doctrine
Modern regulatory action is typically preceded by a broad delegation of
authority from Congress to an administrative agency to implement a federal
program. 19 The agency is usually authorized to promulgate regulations to
implement its statutory authority and take enforcement action against regulated
entities that violate the statute or the implementing regulations adopted by the
agency. For example, Congress may delegate authority to the EPA to promote
clean air, and the agency could establish limitations on air pollution that it
could subsequently enforce against alleged violators of the law.2 °
17 Coffee, supra note 15, at 49.
18 Id. at 46.
19 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by
Congress."). For a discussion and critique of the increasingly broad scope of congressional delegations of
authority to agencies, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
20 Private rights of action to enforce federal statutes would also alleviate some of the problems that are
described above, but an evaluation of this potential solution is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
comprehensive treatment of private rights of action, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982). Another possible solution to the problems
posed by regulatory inaction would be the increased use of "prompt letters" by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). For a discussion of this process and some of its limitations, see Nicholas Bagley
& Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1277-80
(2006).
2009]
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Regulated entities that oppose aggressive regulatory action or believe that
an agency is exceeding its statutory authority ordinarily have several
opportunities to voice their concerns and challenge the legality of agency
action. In addition to participating in the legislative process that resulted in the
initial delegation of administrative authority, regulated entities are entitled to
notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed regulations, 21 and they can
typically challenge an agency's final rules in federal court based on procedural
defects or on the grounds that they are arbitrary and capricious or contrary to
law.22 If an agency's regulations are deemed facially valid, subsequent
enforcement action must still be consistent with procedural due process and, if
applicable, the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for formal
adjudication. 23 At the close of an agency's adjudicatory proceedings, regulated
entities that are adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action can obtain
judicial review of the agency's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and related
policy determinations.
24
The prevailing rules of administrative law make it far more difficult to
challenge an agency's refusal to take action on the grounds that the decision is
arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. First, a plaintiff may have
difficulty establishing standing to challenge an agency's unduly lenient
enforcement of its statutory mandate. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Supreme Court held that Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff in
federal court to prove that she is facing a concrete and particularized injury in
fact, which is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be
redressed by a judgment in the plaintiff's favor.25 In the process, the Court
determined that the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act,
which authorized "any person" to commence a civil suit to enjoin alleged
26violations of the statute, was unconstitutional as applied. The Court
acknowledged that under its analysis, a litigant's standing will often be
affected by "whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
21 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006). Regulatory beneficiaries can, of course, also participate in notice-and-
comment rulemaking, but their comments may be less influential than those of regulated entities for reasons
explored in the rest of this Part. See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006) (authorizing judicial review of final agency action on various grounds).
23 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMNISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 239-93, 316-26 (5th ed.
2009) (discussing procedural due process and formal adjudication).
24 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2) (2006).
25 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (listing the requirements for standing). See also Sunstein, What's Standing?,
supra note 5, at 197-202 (analyzing the Court's decision in Lujan).
26 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-66.
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foregone action) at issue." 2 7 If the plaintiff is an "object" of regulation, the
requirements of standing will ordinarily be met.28 On the other hand, when an
"injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. 29  This dichotomy is
required, according to the Court, by separation of powers principles:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.,
30
Even if a plaintiff is able to establish standing, an agency's failure to
implement its statutory mandate may not be subject to judicial review under
the APA. At first blush, this is a surprising outcome under the APA, which
expressly defines "agency action" to include the "failure to act," 31 and
obligates courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed., 32 Nonetheless, in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(SUWA), the Supreme Court unanimously held that a claim under Section
706(1) of the APA "can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency
failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take. 33
Accordingly, the Court determined that the Bureau of Land Management's
refusal to prohibit the use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) in wilderness study
areas was not subject to judicial review under the APA-even though the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 required the Secretary to
"manage such lands ... in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such
areas for preservation as wilderness." 34  The Court noted that while this
provision "is mandatory as to the object to be achieved," it leaves the agency
with "a great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it," and "[i]t
assuredly does not mandate, with the clarity necessary to support judicial
action under [the APA], the total exclusion of ORV use." 35 These limitations
27 Id. at 561.
28 Id. at 561-62.
29 Id. at 562.
30 Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
31 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).
32 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
" 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
34 Id. at 59, 66 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976)).
15 Id. at 66.
2009]
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on judicial review were deemed necessary "to protect agencies from undue
judicial interference with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial
entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise
and information to resolve." 36 The Court emphasized:
[If judges] were empowered to enter general orders compelling
compliance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be
empowered, as well, to determine whether compliance was
achieved-which would mean that it would ultimately become the
task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out
compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into
day-to-day agency management.37
While the decision in SUWA prevents judicial review of an agency's
38
alleged failure to implement a "broad" statutory mandate, the Court has also
declared that an agency's refusal to take enforcement action against alleged
violations of existing legal prohibitions is presumptively unreviewable. In
Heckler v. Chaney, the Court held that a non-enforcement decision by the Food
and Drug Administration was "'committed to agency discretion by law"' and
therefore precluded from judicial review under the APA.39  The Court
distinguished Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, which adopted a
presumption in favor of judicial review, on the ground that it involved a
challenge to "an affirmative act.., under a statute that set clear guidelines" for
the agency to follow in making a decision. The Court explained that
"[r]efusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite
situation, and in that situation we think the presumption is that judicial review
is not available. 41
The Court articulated several reasons for its conclusion that non-
enforcement decisions are "generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion."'42 Most fundamentally, it claimed that the judiciary is generally
unsuited for the task of reviewing non-enforcement decisions because they
36 Id.
37 Id. at 66-67.
38 It is certainly possible to read the relevant statutory language to require the Bureau of Land
Management to take action to prohibit the use of ORVs in wilderness study areas. Nonetheless, the Court
would apparently require this directive to be explicit in the statutory text to justify judicial review under the
APA.
'9 470 U.S. 821, 830-35 (1985) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1966)).
40 Id. at 831 (distinguishing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 831-32.
[Vol. 59
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involve "a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within [an agency's] expertise." 43 In this regard, the Court emphasized that
agencies are necessarily required to establish enforcement priorities in order to
make the best use of their limited resources.44 The Court also pointed out that
non-enforcement decisions are less likely to implicate protected liberty or
property interests than agency action because they are typically non-coercive
in nature.4 5 The Court further explained that agency action provides a focus
for judicial review-whether the agency has exceeded its statutory authority-
which is generally missing from non-enforcement decisions, where the Court
found that there is "no law to apply.",46 Finally, the Court claimed that:
[A]n agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent
the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive
Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the
special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed. 47
Each of the foregoing decisions leaves agencies with substantial,
unreviewable discretion to decline to take action that is allegedly authorized or
mandated by their governing statutes. Moreover, the rationale for each
decision is essentially the same-to prevent the judiciary from interfering with
the Executive Branch's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." At the same time, if an agency had reached the opposite conclusion
in each case and taken the relatively aggressive regulatory action that was
requested by petitioners, those decisions would have been subject to judicial
review under the applicable legal doctrines. For example, a developer who lost
funding based on the EPA's application of the Endangered Species Act outside
of the United States would likely have standing to challenge the validity of that
decision. 48  Similarly, users of off-road vehicles in wilderness study areas
would almost certainly be entitled to judicial review of a final decision by the
41 Id. at 831.
44 Id. at 831-32.
41 Id. at 832.
46 Id. at 831-32 (contrasting agency action with agency non-action).
47 Id. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
48 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (noting that plaintiffs with a
sufficiently concrete injury would not be required to meet the "normal standards for redressability and
immediacy" in light of the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act); Christopher T. Burt,
Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. Cmi. L. REv. 275, 276
(1995) (discussing the potential implications of this statement).
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Bureau of Land Management to prohibit their activities.49  And, of course,
judicial review is routinely available to anyone who is found to have violated
50the statutory provisions or regulations that are implemented by an agency.
Although courts will often defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous
statutory provisions and other policy determinations, agency action will be
invalidated if it is deemed arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. 51 The
arbitrary and capricious standard, in particular, has been described as "hard-
look review" because courts demand a reasoned explanation for the agency's
final decision, which focuses on whether:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.52
To be sure, the doctrinal hurdles the Court has imposed on plaintiffs who
seek judicial review of agency inaction are not always insurmountable. For
example, SUWA recognized that plaintiffs with standing can obtain judicial
review to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed" when plaintiffs claim that "an agency failed to take a discrete agency
action that it is required to take. 53 Courts have also been willing to entertain
49 See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 315 (2d ed. 2002)
("[S]tanding is not an issue for those who object to regulation of their own conduct.").
50 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983) ("[W]hen an individual who is the very object of a law's requirement or
prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has standing. That is the classic case of the law bearing down
upon the individual himself, and the court will not pause to inquire whether the grievance is a 'generalized'
one.").
51 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). Similarly, an agency's factual findings in formal adjudication are subject
to judicial review under the substantial evidence test. § 706(2)(E); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
91, 112 (1992) (applying the substantial evidence test to uphold agency factual findings).
52 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
53 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 62, 64 (2004). This situation is most
likely to arise when Congress has required an agency to take specific action within a certain period of time.
See id. at 65 ("For example, 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1), which required the Federal Communications Commission
'to establish regulations to implement' interconnection requirements '[w]ithin 6 months' of the date of
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, would have supported a judicial decree under the APA
requiring the prompt issuance of regulations ...."); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in
Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 923, 951 (2008) ("[D]eadlines provide a rare opportunity for parties to
successfully sue for agency inaction under Section 706(1) of the APA.").
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54challenges to the legality of an agency's denial of a rulemaking petition, even
though such decisions could easily be characterized as unreviewable agency
inaction. 55  Finally, the presumption against judicial review of non-
enforcement decisions can be overcome if a statute explicitly requires
enforcement against specified violations or if the statute or an agency's
regulations provide concrete guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising
56its enforcement discretion. Even in these situations, however, courts
generally apply exceptionally deferential standards of review,57 and courts
have limited remedial options available to them even when they determine that
the applicable standards were violated. 58  As a result, courts rarely order
54 The APA provides that "[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). It also provides that "[p]rompt notice shall be
given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person
made in connection with any agency proceeding," and that "the notice shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial." § 555(e). If the agency grants a petition and initiates a rule-making
proceeding, no issue for judicial review arises, but if the agency does not respond to the petition within a
reasonable time, or if the agency denies the petition, the petitioner can seek judicial review under the APA.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (reviewing the denial of a rule-making petition); Am.
Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985), and concluding that denials of rule-making petitions are subject to judicial review under the APA).
See also WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 62-74 (3d ed. 2006)
(describing the relevant APA provisions and case law on petitions for rulemaking).
55 See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
10-13 (2008) (claiming that the distinction between agency inaction and agency action under sections 706(1)
and 706(2) of the APA is incoherent and unworkable).
56 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 295-96 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that an agency's
decision not to seek enforcement action was not committed to agency discretion by law because the relevant
statutory provisions left no discretion to determine which cases to pursue); Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (explaining that a decision of the Secretary of Labor not to file suit under the Labor-Management
Disclosure Act of 1959 is subject to judicial review under the APA because the statute withdraws discretion
from the agency and provides guidelines for the exercise of its enforcement power).
57 See, e.g., Ark. Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that "the
scope of review under the [APA] of an agency decision to deny a rulemaking petition is very narrow," and that
the judiciary's role "is limited to ensuring that the agency has adequately explained the facts and policy
concerns it relied on, and that the facts have some basis in the record"). Similarly, in the non-enforcement
context, an agency's determination of whether the triggering mechanism for mandatory enforcement action has
been activated will generally receive substantial judicial deference. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,
572-73 (1975) (explaining that judicial review of a non-enforcement decision under the arbitrary and
capricious standard is limited and "may not extend to cognizance or trial of a complaining member's
challenges to the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusion either that no violations occurred or that they did
not affect the outcome of the election"); Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a
court may only consider challenges to the factual basis for an agency's decision not to take enforcement action
in very limited circumstances).
58 See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (describing the remedial limitations ofjudicial review of
agency inaction). For an illustrative discussion of the remedial difficulties associated with enforcing statutory
deadlines, see Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 53, at 953-55, 964-66.
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agencies to promulgate regulations or take enforcement action, and even when
they require agencies to fulfill mandatory statutory obligations (such as
meeting congressionally-imposed deadlines), courts are not ordinarily
empowered to dictate the form that such actions must take.
Commentators have recognized that the foregoing doctrines create an
asymmetry between the legal treatment of regulated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries. 9 On one hand, regulated entities are routinely granted access to
legal relief when they contend that unduly aggressive agency action is arbitrary
and capricious or contrary to law. On the other hand, regulatory beneficiaries
are frequently denied access to legal relief when they challenge an agency's
refusal to implement its statutory mandate in a sufficiently vigorous fashion on
the same underlying bases.
B. The Unwarranted Nature of This Asymmetry
Critics of the status quo have recognized that this particular dichotomy
makes no sense in the modem administrative state. For example, Cass
Sunstein has explained that the disparate legal treatment of regulated entities
and regulatory beneficiaries is premised upon the related assumptions that
"market ordering within the constraints of the common law" is the natural state
of affairs, and the judiciary's proper role is "to safeguard traditional private
rights as defined by the common law." 60 From this perspective, governmental
intervention in the free market is viewed as exceptional and subject to judicial
review. Conversely, the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, which were
unprotected at common law, are not entitled to judicial protection. Rather, the
appropriate safeguard against unlawful regulatory inaction is through the
political process, where the generalized grievances of large numbers of people
will presumably be heard. The judiciary should therefore adopt what is "in
effect a one-way ratchet, consisting of legally enforceable constraints on
regulation but no such constraints on inaction." 61 Sunstein characterizes this
perspective as "a Lochner-like view of the judicial role," and points out that
"[t]he Lochner Court, too, saw the judicial role as the vindication of private
59 See supra notes 5-6. See also Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U.
L. REv. 297, 348-54 (2004) (discussing a perceived favoritism among parties in the Rehnquist Court's
standing decisions and asserting that "[i]n the arena of regulatory policy, this tendency expresses itself in three
overlapping tendencies that result in standing for plaintiffs with an anti-regulatory claim and not for those with
a pro-regulatory claim").
60 Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 666.
61 Id
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rights, defined by reference to market ordering within the common law, against
government 'intervention."'
62
The implication, of course, is that this understanding of democratic
governance and the proper scope of judicial review is both severely flawed and
outdated. Students often learn on the first day of administrative law that there
is nothing inherently natural about free-market ordering under the common
63law. Rather, this is one of many possible approaches to regulation that
societies have sometimes chosen. Students also learn that the implementation
of command-and-control regulation by agencies with broad statutory authority
is the norm rather than the exception in the modem administrative state.
64
Most federal agencies were explicitly established by Congress to protect
interests that were not recognized at common law.65  Free-market ordering
under the common law, in effect, protected one set of beneficiaries (for
example, property owners and parties to contracts), whereas modern regulatory
statutes tend to protect another set of beneficiaries (for example, workers,
consumers, and stewards of the environment). A legal regime that protects the
interests of one set of beneficiaries (by reviewing the validity of agency action)
and not the other (by declining to review agency inaction) amounts to a judicial
66rejection of the modern regulatory state established by Congress.
Aside from an ideological opposition to regulation, there is nothing to
suggest that judicial review of agency action performs functions that are
unnecessary when an agency declines to implement its statutory mandate. An
agency can make decisions that are contrary to law by taking action that
exceeds its statutory authority, as well as by refusing to take action that is
statutorily required. Similarly, an agency can exercise its discretionary
authority in an arbitrary and capricious fashion by taking action that is
unsupported by a reasoned explanation, as well as by failing to engage in
reasoned decision making when the agency declines to take action that is
authorized by statute. Because agencies can potentially violate their statutory
authority or engage in arbitrary and capricious decision making by
62 Id. at 667.
63 See, e.g., JOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 6-9 (1995).
64 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42 (3d ed. 1991) ("'Broad delegation.., is the
hallmark of the modem administrative state."' (quoting Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516)).
65 See REESE, supra note 63, at 9 ("[An agency] is created to achieve legislatively assigned goals.
Therefore, it is an active arm of government that does not sit passively and await developments.").
66 See Sunstein, What's Standing?, supra note 5, at 196-97.
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implementing their programs in an unduly aggressive fashion or in an unduly
lenient fashion, the purposes of judicial review would be more fully served if
this safeguard were equally available in both contexts.
67
The most obvious problem with the judiciary's reluctance to review agency
inaction is that it allows the Executive Branch to deviate from statutory
mandates and render arbitrary and capricious decisions with impunity. At the
same time, however, the asymmetry between the legal relief that is available to
regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries creates perverse incentives in the
administrative process. Because regulated entities can routinely secure judicial
review of regulatory action, whereas regulatory beneficiaries frequently cannot
secure judicial review of agency inaction, agencies have incentives to pay more
attention to the interests and perspectives of regulated entities-and to ignore the
views of regulatory beneficiaries-during the administrative process. 68 When this
incentive structure is combined with the collective action problems that
regulatory beneficiaries already predictably face based on well-accepted
lessons from public choice theory, regulatory capture by narrow special
interests is facilitated.69  This is precisely the result that the structural
safeguards of our legal system, including judicial review, are designed to
prevent.70
67 See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 668-69 (explaining that the purposes of
judicial review under the APA "apply with equal force to action and inaction"); see also Eric Biber, Two Sides
of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461-62
(2008) (claiming that "there is no fundamental difference between judicial review of agency inaction or action
under the APA," and that "[t]he same underlying principles of administrative law apply in both
circumstances"); Bressman, supra note 5, at 1691 (explaining that because "[a]gency inaction is subject to the
same influences that derail agency action from public purposes to private gains[,] .. .the requirements that
tend to fight these influences are equally necessary in both settings").
68 See supra note 5.
69 See generally MANCUR OLSON, TiE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (claiming that interest
groups are most likely to form and seek to influence politics when there are a small number of interested
members with large stakes in the outcome). See also Biber, supra note 55, at 40-48 (explaining that public
choice theory would suggest that "agency failures to implement regulatory statutes may be the result of
asymmetries in the ability of regulatory subjects and regulatory beneficiaries to monitor and influence the
political process"); Sunstein, What's Standing?, supra note 5, at 183-84 (claiming that in light of the
possibility of "agency capture" by organized special interests, "it seemed positively perverse to grant standing
to objects and not to beneficiaries" of regulation).
70 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 5, at 1688-89 ("The Framers sought to structure our government to
advance public purposes rather than narrow interests."); Pierce, supra note 5, at 1195 (explaining how the
broad application of the standing decision in Lujan would "maximize[] the potential growth of the political
pathology the Framers most feared and strived to minimize"). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (explaining that the Framers designed the American
Constitution to counteract the problem of interest group faction).
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In sum, the Supreme Court has endorsed a variety of doctrines that create
an asymmetry between the legal treatment of regulated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries. This situation is deeply problematic because it reflects
unwarranted judicial resistance to the modem regulatory state. It also permits
agencies to deviate from statutory mandates and engage in arbitrary decision
making in selected contexts. Finally, it creates an unjustified incentive for
agencies to favor regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries during the
administrative process. The next Part describes the solution that other scholars
have proposed to alleviate these concerns, as well as the shortcomings of prior
reform proposals.
II. THE STANDARD SOLUTION AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
Given the problems with the status quo, it is hardly surprising that several
scholars have advocated increasing the availability ofjudicial review of agency
inaction. 71 This approach would reduce the incentives for agencies to favor
regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries during the administrative
process. It would also reduce arbitrary decision making by agencies and
improve their compliance with statutory mandates. By eliminating the
asymmetrical legal treatment of regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries,
this course of action would recognize that the interests protected by modem
regulatory statutes deserve the same judicial solicitude as legal interests that
were traditionally protected at common law. Finally, a judicially-enforced
obligation for agencies to provide reasoned explanations for refusing to take
action that is authorized by statute would improve the democratic
accountability and, hence, legitimacy of administrative decision making.72 In
light of these potential benefits, one might wonder why these reform proposals
have not been enthusiastically embraced by the judiciary.
One reason for the Supreme Court's reluctance to make judicial review of
agency inaction more readily available stems from its continued adherence to
what Keith Werhan has called the "neoclassical model" of administrative
73law. This model emerged during the 1980s in response to perceived excesses
71 See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text (discussing various reform proposals).
72 See Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1283 ("Reason-giving can ... be understood as the enforcement
mechanism that holds public officials accountable for making legitimate policy choices in a deliberative
democracy.").
73 See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADmiN. L. REV. 567, 568
(1992); see also Herz, supra note 59 (identifying similar themes in the Rehnquist Court's administrative law
jurisprudence).
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of judicial activism during the interest-representation era of the 1960s and
70S.74 As Werhan perceptively explains:
The neoclassical model seeks to unite the classical distinction
between law and policy with a postmodem skepticism about the
competence and integrity of courts to oversee agency
decisionmaking. The distinguishing trademark, and bite, of the
model is its rigid definition of "law," one which limits the concept to
the clearly expressed intent of an authoritative lawmaker, such as
Congress, and which thereby denies reviewing courts an active role
in the administrative process.75
The dominant theme of neoclassical judicial decisions is that "courts are no
longer available to protect those whose interests are affected by administrative
actors unless the action can be said to violate some right held by the affected
party. ' '76 Such decisions purport to limit policy making by the judiciary, in
turn, "by defining 'right' to include only those interests that are protected by
clear provisions of 'law.'
77
The Supreme Court's decisions that have limited the availability of judicial
review of agency inaction fit squarely within the neoclassical model of
administrative law.78 For example, limiting judicial review of an agency's
failure to act under the APA to situations where plaintiffs assert that the agency
failed to take a discrete action that it is required to take maintains the
judiciary's authority to uphold the "law," while simultaneously ensuring that
discretionary policy choices regarding the best manner of implementing a
broad statutory mandate are left to the political branches. Similarly, a
presumption against judicial review of non-enforcement decisions is premised
on the belief that such decisions are policy determinations that should be made
by politically accountable officials. 79 Although the promulgation of a statute
or regulation establishes the substantive content of the law, enforcement
decisions of the Executive are another matter altogether. The meaning of a
74 See Werhan, supra note 73, at 620.
71 Id. at 568.
76 Id. at 620.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 597-602.
79 See Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 143, 175.
80 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (explaining that administrative action is "committed
to agency discretion by law" under the APA when statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is "no law to apply"); Scalia, supra note 9, at 105 ("Establishing environmental requirements is one
thing; enforcing them is something else.").
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statute or regulation is governed by law and is therefore the proper subject of
interpretation by courts in an Article III case or controversy. Yet, a decision
not to enforce a statute or regulation in the first instance is a policy matter that
presumably falls within the absolute discretion of the Executive Branch and is
therefore not properly subject to judicial review.81 A contrary decision would
allow politically unaccountable courts to interfere with the Executive's ability
to make politically acceptable decisions and potentially displace the policy
choices of administrative agencies in favor of the preferred interests of courts.
Finally, although Lujan arguably conflicts with the neoclassical model because
Congress expressly authorized citizen suits under the Endangered Species
Act,82 strict limitations on citizen standing are obviously consistent with an
overarching desire to immunize the Executive Branch's "policy decisions"
regarding how to implement the law from judicial review. The Lujan decision
could therefore be understood as an effort by the Court to "constitutionalize"
aspects of the neoclassical model of administrative law, irrespective of
Congress's preferences regarding the availability of judicial review of
administrative decisions.
The neoclassical model of administrative law is vulnerable to criticism on
many grounds, including those set forth in the previous section. The point,
however, is that from this perspective, non-enforcement decisions and other
agency inaction would ordinarily be viewed as a "political" matter that is none
of the judiciary's business. 83 As a result, the justices who adhere to this model
strongly favor, and if anything might prefer to extend, precisely those doctrines
that create the asymmetry between the legal treatment of regulated entities and
regulatory beneficiaries. Moreover, because the appropriate legal treatment of
agency inaction raises fundamental issues of political, constitutional, and legal
theory, it is extremely unlikely that these justices are going to change their
minds in the foreseeable future.
Another reason for the Court's reluctance to make judicial review of
agency inaction more readily available stems from the practical difficulties
associated with any such effort. First, as the Court explained in Heckler, the
81 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834 ("The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with
sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the most appropriate body to police
this aspect of their performance.").
82 See Pierce, supra note 5, at 1198-1201 (contending that the decision in Lujan "cannot be characterized
as part of the Court's agenda to reduce the role of the judiciary in governmental policymaking").
83 See Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L. J. 191, 193-94
(1986).
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judiciary is arguably unsuited for the task of reviewing particular non-
enforcement decisions because of the balancing of various policy
considerations that is necessarily involved:
[T]he agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred,
but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the
particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to
undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against
each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.
The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 4
Consistent with this concern, administrative decisions that decline to take
enforcement action are likely to be far more numerous than final agency
action, which means that the availability of judicial review in this area could
severely drain limited administrative and judicial resources. Finally, judicial
review of administrative inaction would, at best, provide a limited remedy for
arbitrary governmental action. In most cases, judicial review would be limited
to assessing whether an agency provided a reasoned explanation for its
decision.85 In the absence of a reasoned explanation, the agency's decision
would be deemed arbitrary and capricious and therefore vacated and remanded
for more careful consideration. 8 6  Except in rare cases where Congress is
deemed to have imposed mandatory obligations on agencies, the judiciary
would ordinarily decline to order agencies to take the affirmative action that is
positively authorized by statute.
87
84 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
85 See Prof l Pilots Fed'n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that an agency must
have provided a reasoned explanation for its chosen course of action, "responded to 'relevant' and 'significant'
public comments,... and demonstrated that it afforded adequate consideration to every reasonable alternative
presented for its consideration").
86 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) ("In short, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation
for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was
therefore 'arbitrary, capricious,.., or otherwise not in accordance with law."').
87 See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("If [Congress] has indicated an
intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the
limits of that discretion, there is 'law to apply' . . . and courts may require that the agency follow that law; if it
has not, then an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision 'committed to agency discretion by law'
within the meaning of that section.").
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Even the sharpest critics of the Court's current approach to agency inaction
have recognized the validity of these practical concerns. 88 Commentators have
therefore "hedged" or moderated their calls for increased judicial review of
agency inaction in a variety of ways. For example, Cass Sunstein claims that
standing should be a function of whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly
conferred a cause of action on the plaintiff,89 and that judicial review of agency
inaction should frequently be available. 90 He concedes, however, that "[a]n
allegation that an agency has acted arbitrarily because it has failed to take
action against a particular violation of the governing statute presents the
weakest claim for reviewability" because it implicates "all the concerns
emphasized by the Chaney Court about judicial involvement in the allocation
of scarce prosecutorial resources." 91  Lisa Bressman rejects the Court's
disparate treatment of agency action and inaction and argues that "courts
generally should treat these agency behaviors similarly and subject agency
inaction to judicial review." 92 Nonetheless, she contends that "standing may
be compared to nondelegation doctrine, inhibiting Congress from effectively
delegating policymaking power to private parties through statutory citizen-suit
provisions. 93 She also claims that nonreviewability under the APA "can be
better understood as an analogue to political question doctrine, preventing
courts from examining conduct committed to the unfettered discretion of
administrative officials. 94  In any event, she concludes that "both
nonreviewability and standing (as well as the [APA] provisions that ground
them) can be viewed as links to separation of powers doctrine, barring courts
from hearing challenges to the generalized manner in which agencies perform
their jobs."95  Some commentators, including Ashutosh Bhagwat, have
88 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 182 (1996) ("[T]here are substantial practical barriers to a regime of pervasive,
searching judicial review of agency non-enforcement decisions."); Bressman, supra note 5, at 1678 (describing
the "administrative concerns" offered by the Chaney Court as "the most persuasive-perhaps the only
persuasive-rationale" for its decision); Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 672-73
(acknowledging that certain prudential concerns "do serve to distinguish action from inaction, and they must
be taken into account").
89 See Sunstein, What's Standing?, supra note 5, at 191; see also Pierce, supra note 5, at 1198-1201
(claiming that standing in statutory cases should be a function of legislative intent).
90 See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 676-83 (analyzing the reviewability of
various types of agency inaction).
91 Id. at 682.
92 Bressman, supra note 5, at 1661; see also id. at 1687-97.
93 Id. at 1662; see also id. at 1702-05.
94 Id. at 1662; see also id. at 1698-1702.
95 Id. at 1662; see also id. at 1705-14.
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suggested that the practical barriers to judicial review of agency inaction could
be overcome by evaluating those decisions under appropriately deferential
standards, 96 while others propose hinging the availability of judicial review on
balancing tests that either (1) explicitly weigh the need for judicial deference to
agency resource allocation decisions against the judiciary's duty to uphold
congressional mandates;97 or (2) examine whether other forms of judicial
review are available, whether a non-enforcement decision is likely to lead to
substantial hardship, and whether the non-enforcement decision is consistent
with the underlying statute.98
There is much to admire in these proposals, and they could well improve
upon the status quo. Specifically, each proposal would go a long way toward
ensuring that an agency's refusal to take enforcement action is consistent with
clear statutory and regulatory mandates. In addition, both Bhagwat and
Bressman would facilitate this aspect of judicial review by requiring agencies
to adopt and subsequently follow enforcement guidelines that would constrain
the scope of agency discretion.99 Nonetheless, by carving out a range of
exceptions, agencies would still be able to engage in arbitrary decision making
when judicial review of agency inaction is unavailable under these proposals.
For example, Sunstein would apparently give agencies free reign to make
"purely arbitrary" decisions by generally excluding from the scope of judicial
review of agency inaction freestanding claims that agencies failed to engage in
96 See Bhagwat, supra note 88, at 182-91. Bhagwat claims that non-enforcement decisions should be
subject to judicial review for reasoned decision making and that:
[H]ighly deferential review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of those aspects of an
agency's stated policy which involve administrative and discretionary matters, such as the best
allocation of limited resources, or the prioritization of socially harmful violations, would permit
agencies to retain largely untrammeled authority in those areas where they need it the most
thereby addressing the gravest pragmatic concerns raised by the Chaney Court.
Id. at 185. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-42, 855 (Marshall, J., concurring) (claiming that
non-enforcement decisions should be subject to judicial review under a particularly deferential version of the
arbitrary and capricious standard that simultaneously requires agencies to provide reasoned explanations for
their decisions and recognizes "an agency's legitimate need to set policy through the allocation of scarce
budgetary and enforcement resources").
97 See Biber, supra note 55, at 4-5.
98 See Ruth Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TuL. L. REv. 877, 910-11 (1989).
99 Bhagwat, supra note 88, at 183 ("[A] system of judicial review in this area must rest centrally on a
requirement-one new to administrative law and representing an admittedly significant departure from
existing practice-that agencies state, and then consistently follow, a rational policy regarding enforcement
priorities and disposition of enforcement resources."); Bressman, supra note 5, at 1661 ("[A]dministrative
nonenforcement decisions should be subject to the important requirement that agencies promulgate and follow
standards guiding their affirmative regulatory authority.").
[Vol. 59
HeinOnline -- 59 Emory L.J. 390 2009-2010
THE FEDERAL INACTION COMMISSION
reasoned decision making. 100 Similarly, Bressman would preclude courts from
hearing "generalized grievances" regarding the manner in which agencies
implement their broad statutory mandates. 10 1  Yet, agencies can arbitrarily
refuse to take action that is within the scope of their statutory authority even
when there are no specific legal directives already on the books that
affirmatively compel them to do so. The bottom line is that any approach to
judicial review of agency inaction that is less than comprehensive will
inevitably allow arbitrary decisions to stand. And, in situations where judicial
review is unavailable, agencies will continue to have strong incentives to favor
regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries in the administrative process.
A second shortcoming of the existing reform proposals is that they do not
adequately address the substantial costs that would be associated with
increasing the availability of judicial review of agency inaction. The proposed
solutions involve precluding judicial review of non-enforcement decisions and
other agency inaction when resource allocation considerations are likely to be
predominant or deferring more heavily to agency inaction that is expressly
justified on this basis. As explained above, however, the former solution
would necessarily allow a potentially substantial number of arbitrary
administrative decisions to stand. Moreover, the latter solution would give
agencies a tailor-made excuse for nearly any inaction that would be extremely
difficult for courts to evaluate because judicial review is typically conducted
on a case-by-case basis in a manner that presents specific legal issues in
isolation from the broader programmatic responsibilities of agencies. 102 Thus,
if courts were regularly authorized to review agency inaction, we might predict
that they would either sympathize unduly with plaintiffs and underestimate the
resource constraints facing agencies or rubberstamp decisions not to take
regulatory action that are allegedly justified by an agency's competing
priorities-without a sound basis for evaluating which position is truly
warranted. 103
100 See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 673 ("[A] generalized allegation of
arbitrariness will often be an insufficient basis for judicial review.").
101 See Bressman, supra note 5, at 1705 (claiming there is a "need for some principle to preclude the
adjudication of truly generalized grievances while still permitting the adjudication of legitimate arbitrariness
claims").
102 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 12
(2004) (explaining that "[u]nlike courts, agencies can and do make multi-dimensional decisions, creating
packages to surmount political impasses," and claiming that "for judges compelled to consider issues in
isolation, there just isn't anything there except for the text").
103 See Biber, supra note 55, at 26-27 (recognizing the difficulty that courts would have in closely
examining the veracity of claims that an agency's decision was based on resource concerns).
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A final shortcoming of existing reform proposals is that they do not
eliminate the remedial difficulties that would be presented by judicial review
of agency inaction.104  On one hand, allowing citizen standing that is
authorized by Congress (as Pierce and Sunstein recommend) and requiring
agencies to promulgate and follow enforcement guidelines (as proposed by
Bhagwat and Bressman) would increase the likelihood that courts would order
agencies to follow unambiguous statutory and regulatory mandates. On the
other hand, judicial review would otherwise be limited to assessing whether an
agency provided a reasoned explanation for non-enforcement decisions and
other inaction. In the absence of a reasoned explanation, the agency's decision
would be vacated and remanded for more careful consideration. The judiciary
would ordinarily decline to order agencies to take the affirmative action that is
positively authorized by statute in these circumstances. To be fair, these
remedial limitations appear intractable, and a judicially-enforced requirement
that agencies provide a reasoned explanation for their inaction would have
significant value for a host of reasons. 105 Nonetheless, as things currently
stand, non-enforcement decisions and other forms of regulatory inaction
remain a serious problem in search of a workable solution.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL
Instead of seeking to redress the deficiencies in contemporary
administrative law through increased judicial review of non-enforcement
decisions and other regulatory inaction, this Part proposes the establishment of
the "Federal Inaction Commission" (FIC). It begins by describing the powers
and responsibilities that would be delegated to this new, independent
administrative agency. It also explains that the FIC would provide the same
essential benefits that are expected to result from judicial review of non-
enforcement decisions and other inaction by administrative agencies, while
simultaneously minimizing the theoretical objections and practical
disadvantages that have been identified with judicial review of such inaction.
This proposal therefore fits comfortably within the recent movement in
administrative law scholarship to encourage the adoption of internal checks
104 See supra notes 58, 85-87 and accompanying text (describing the remedial limitations of judicial
review of agency inaction).
105 See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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and balances within the Executive Branch, 106 which is an explicit focus of the
symposium for which this Article was written. 10 7 However, I also tend to view
the FIC as an "external" check on decision making by Executive Branch
agencies, which is why I believe that it is important to keep the agency
relatively independent. 10 8  In any event, the combination of lawmaking and
enforcement powers within agencies, together with the absence of meaningful
external review mechanisms, renders the existing legal treatment of inaction by
administrative agencies particularly dangerous from a democratic
perspective. 10 9
A. The Powers and Responsibilities of the Federal Inaction Commission
Congress should enact a statute that creates a new, independent
administrative agency to oversee, monitor, and evaluate decisions by Executive
Branch agencies not to implement their existing statutory authority. 11° Under
106 For some leading examples, see Barkow, supra note 15; Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and
the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869 (2009); Mariano-
Florentino Cu6llar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 227 (2006); and Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE
L.J. 2314 (2006).
107 The author participated in the panel entitled, "Institutional Design and the Internal Separation of
Powers" at the 2009 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium at Emory University School of Law.
108 See infra Part IV (discussing the FIC's ideal structure and evaluating various alternatives in greater
detail).
109 For example, the combination of lawmaking and enforcement functions within agencies potentially
allows them simultaneously to promulgate generally applicable regulations and to single out disfavored
regulated entities for selective prosecution (or, conversely, to provide preferential treatment to politically
favored entities). For a more elaborate example, see BUZBEE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 16-18, which describes
the lax enforcement of the Clean Water Act under the George W. Bush Administration, reportedly including:
(1) the promulgation of a guidance document that instructed field officers who were enforcing the statute
consistent with existing regulations to obtain approval from headquarters, while not requiring approval from
headquarters for decisions not to enforce those regulations; (2) unsuccessful efforts to amend the regulations to
limit their scope consistent with the Administration's preferred interpretation of the statute; and (3) a decision
to leave the guidance document in place, despite widespread public opposition to the Administration's narrow
interpretation of the statute, which emerged in response to an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
110 Of course, Congress may want to choose a more politically correct name for this agency, such as the
"Federal Enforcement Commission." In any event, one issue that would need to be considered is whether the
FIC's oversight authority should be extended to independent agencies within the Executive Branch or whether
it should be limited to pure executive agencies whose leadership is removable at the will of the President. This
Article does not thoroughly examine the distinct legal and policy issues that would be raised by extending this
proposal to independent agencies. On one hand, some forms of political oversight of independent agencies are
widely understood as problematic because they arguably conflict with Congress's intent to shield such
agencies from political influence and therefore potentially raise separation of powers concerns. For this
reason, the executive orders that authorize presidential review of proposed regulations by executive agencies
have never extended to independent agencies. On the other hand, independent agencies are generally subject
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this proposal, the FIC would be charged with six primary powers and
responsibilities: (1) identifying policy areas in which Executive Branch
agencies have declined to exercise their delegated statutory authority; (2)
directing Executive Branch agencies to adopt sensible enforcement guidelines
for their existing programs; (3) investigating and resolving complaints
regarding particular non-enforcement decisions by Executive Branch agencies;
(4) securing reasoned explanations from Executive Branch agencies for any
perceived deficiencies in the foregoing areas; (5) reporting to elected officials
and the public on the nature and scope of the regulatory inaction by Executive
Branch agencies; and (6) making recommendations regarding budgetary
matters and substantive legislation that could alleviate the perceived
deficiencies.
The first significant power and responsibility of the FIC would be to
identify policy areas where Executive Branch agencies have declined to
exercise their delegated statutory authority. Because this function would
require knowledge and expertise regarding specific Executive Branch agencies
and their programs, the FIC should be organized into departments that
correspond with the jurisdictions of relevant congressional committees and
agencies.111 The FIC departments would each be required to identify specific
statutory and regulatory directives that have not been implemented by the
Executive Branch agencies within their jurisdictions. The FIC departments
would also be authorized to identify new policy initiatives that could arguably
be implemented by Executive Branch agencies under their existing statutory
to congressional oversight, APA procedures, and judicial review to the same extent as other executive
agencies. My tentative view is that because the FIC's authority under this proposal would be authorized by
statute (as opposed to an executive order), the problems associated with presidential review of rulemaking by
independent agencies are likely inapplicable. Rather, the FIC's oversight responsibilities seem more
analogous to the external review provided by legislative oversight, the APA, and judicial review. Moreover,
while the political dynamics of executive and independent agencies may differ, there is little reason to think
that independent agencies will not periodically engage in arbitrary or otherwise unlawful inaction. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 15-18 (describing the SEC's failure to regulate abuses in the mutual fund
industry). Accordingly, it seems both permissible and worthwhile to extend the FIC's oversight authority to
independent agencies as well.
111 Standing congressional committees and executive agencies typically have overlapping jurisdictions.
See STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 232 (4th ed. 2006) ("Since the passage of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, standing committees have been assigned the duty of maintaining
'continuous watchfulness' over executive branch activities within their jurisdictions."); see also David Epstein
& Sharyn O'Halloran, Legislative Organization Under Separate Powers, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 390-91
(2001) ("Whereas [congressional] committees have sometimes been portrayed as monopolists in their policy
jurisdictions, then our approach makes it clear that they face credible competition from executive bureaus, and
vice versa.").
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authority. The inaction to be identified by the FIC pursuant to this authority
should include any area where Executive Branch agencies have declined to
take requested action, as well as areas where such agencies have apparently
failed to consider taking action that the FIC considers especially promising or
beneficial. Most of this "inactivity" would-predictably and by design-be
brought to the FIC's attention initially by regulatory beneficiaries who are
disappointed with an agency's failure to implement its statutory authority in a
sufficiently vigorous fashion. Indeed, the FIC could establish a complaint
process that would provide a triggering mechanism for its oversight of the
inactivity of Executive Branch agencies.
The second major power and responsibility of the FIC would be to direct
Executive Branch agencies to establish sensible enforcement guidelines for
their existing programs. This aspect of the FIC's authority would be similar to
what some commentators have advocated in conjunction with increasing the
availability of judicial review of agency inaction.1 12  While those
commentators have not specified the source of the judiciary's authority to
compel agencies to adopt enforcement guidelines, the FIC would be given
explicit statutory authority to require Executive Branch agencies to adopt
reasonable enforcement guidelines under this proposal. The question that
would arise, therefore, is whether the enforcement guidelines that were
adopted by Executive Branch agencies pursuant to this mandate and their
subsequent enforcement decisions would be subject to judicial review under
the APA. The answer under the existing case law is apparently in the
affirmative, n 3 unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise in the FIC's
enabling act. Whether an agency's enforcement guidelines and particular non-
enforcement decisions should be subject to judicial review would depend
largely on one's views of the debate that is described above. For the sake of
making this proposal attractive to a wider audience, this Article takes the
position that judicial review of an agency's enforcement guidelines and
decisions should not be available based on an administrative agency's
112 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing claims by commentators that agencies should be
required to promulgate enforcement guidelines).
113 See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Just as Congress can provide
the basis for judicial review of nonenforcement decisions by spelling out statutory factors to be measured by
courts, so an agency can provide such factors by regulation. When an agency chooses to so fetter its
discretion, the presumption against reviewability recognized in [Heckler v.] Chaney must give way.").
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compliance with a directive from the FIC to establish reasonable enforcement
guidelines. 
114
Nonetheless, the third major power and responsibility of the FIC would be
to investigate and resolve complaints regarding particular non-enforcement
decisions by Executive Branch agencies. The FIC would therefore be
authorized to direct Executive Branch agencies to promulgate enforcement
guidelines for their existing programs and to review subsequent non-
enforcement decisions by those agencies for reasoned decision making and for
compliance with their own guidelines. If the FIC determined in response to a
complaint that an Executive Branch agency failed to follow its enforcement
guidelines or otherwise to engage in reasoned decision making in reaching a
particular non-enforcement decision, the FIC would be empowered to vacate
the agency's decision and to remand the matter to the agency for further
consideration. Thus, the FIC would, in effect, be able to perform the full range
115of functions that commentators have previously advocated for the judiciary.
In addition to reviewing complaints about an agency's non-enforcement
decisions, the FIC would also be empowered to audit each agency's
compliance with its enforcement guidelines. Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar has
persuasively argued that such audits would provide a valuable supplement or
alternative to judicial review of an agency's discretionary decisions. 116 As he
explains, "an audit of executive discretion is a stringent evaluation of a sample
of discrete decisions drawn randomly from a larger pool, using an explicit
standard fixed in advance, with the results announced to the public."'1 17 The
primary benefit of such audits is that a relatively small sample of decisions can
be studied in depth, and the results can reveal substantial information about an
agency's overall performance. 118 Moreover, if random audits are done with
sufficient frequency, an incentive is created for agency officials to improve
114 More broadly, this proposal is not intended to alter the scope ofjudicial review of agency action that is
currently available. Thus, for example, plaintiffs who currently have access to judicial review should not be
required to exhaust their administrative remedies with the FIC before proceeding in federal court. Similarly,
the decisions of the FIC should not be subject to judicial review under the APA. In this regard, the FIC's
decisions would be analogous to the cost-benefit analyses that are currently required (without judicial review)
by executive order.
115 See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
116 See Cudllar, supra note 106.
117 Id. at 252.
118 See id. at 257 ("In exchange for reviewing fewer cases, whoever is conducting the audits can demand
more evidence from the executive branch, more justification, and more access to information-all at a lower
cost than what would be incurred if [every decision were reviewed in a relatively cursory fashion].").
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their performance relative to the articulated standard.119 Because such audits
are most useful when even a cursory review of each decision in a particular
class is impractical, non-enforcement decisions would provide an ideal context
for the use of this technique.
The fourth major power and responsibility of the FIC would be to require
Executive Branch agencies to provide reasoned explanations for other
regulatory inaction. Specifically, the FIC could require agencies to provide
reasoned explanations for their failure to adopt adequate enforcement
guidelines pursuant to a valid request from the FIC. Moreover, the FIC would
be empowered to compel agencies to provide reasoned explanations for failing
to take action that is specifically required by existing statutory and regulatory
mandates. Finally, the FIC could compel agencies to provide reasoned
explanations for refusing to pursue new policy initiatives, which the FIC has
identified as consistent with the agency's existing statutory authority. The FIC
would, in turn, be authorized to review the validity of the foregoing agency
inaction under this proposal. If it determined that an Executive Branch agency
failed to engage in reasoned decision making under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the FIC could invalidate the agency's decision and remand the matter
for further consideration.
The fifth major power and responsibility of the FIC would be to report to
elected officials and the public on the nature and scope of regulatory inaction
by Executive Branch agencies. Administrative law scholars have frequently
sought to construct theories to legitimize the exercise of discretionary authority
by unelected bureaucrats who perform legislative, executive, and judicial
functions. 120  Besides the prospect of judicial review of the legality of their
decisions, numerous commentators have emphasized the importance of
facilitating greater control of agency action by Congress, the President, or
affected interest groups. 121  Other commentators believe that agencies with
expertise should be given greater autonomy; these commentators focus on the
administrative process's capacity to facilitate reasoned deliberation for the
119 Cf id. at 255 ("[R]andom audits (at least when they happen with a sufficiently high probability) make
it harder for the people or organizations being overseen to evade detection.").
120 See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 987, 1007-36 (1997).
121 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. RFv. 2245, 2253-69, 2331-63 (2001)
(describing non-presidential mechanisms of administrative control and making a case for presidential
administration).
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common good as the basis of the regulatory state's legitimacy. The key to
the effective implementation of any of these theories is accurate information
about what agencies are doing and the ability of relevant actors to influence
and respond to agency decision making.123  When agencies take action to
implement their statutory authority, the first world of administrative law-
which is characterized by participatory procedures, presidential review, and a
presumption in favor of judicial review-helps to ensure that these conditions
are met. 124  In contrast, the vast majority of elected officials and interested
members of the public are unlikely to know that Executive Branch agencies
have failed to take action to implement their statutory mandates, particularly
when the structural safeguards of the first world of administrative law are
inapplicable or unavailable. 125 Moreover, agencies could systematically fail to
engage in reasoned decision making in precisely these situations, and
potentially interested parties would be unable to influence or respond to those
decisions. 126 Under this proposal, the FIC would be responsible for alleviating
these shortcomings in administrative law by virtue of its obligation to report to
elected officials and the general public on what Executive Branch agencies are
not doing. 127 This information could, in turn, facilitate a subsequent dialogue
on the legality and desirability of an agency's chosen course of (in)action, and
perhaps elicit a political response. The FIC's reporting function would thereby
improve the legitimacy of the administrative state, as well as providing elected
122 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1511 (1992).
123 Cf Mendelson, supra note 6, at 417-20 (explaining that under the leading theories of the
administrative state's legitimacy, "the agency must be regularly obligated to disclose and justify its actions,
and the agency's authority must be limited by meaningful constraints, whether internal or external").
124 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749
(2007).
125 It is possible, of course, that certain powerful elected officials and interest groups would be aware of,
and indirectly responsible for, these decisions. If other elected officials and interested members of the public
were not let in on the secret, however, there would be no way to hold the responsible public officials
accountable for their actions. As a result, these particular policy decisions would be difficult to square with
theories of democratic legitimacy. See Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1281 ("If citizens are unaware that a
particular governmental official has made a specific policy decision, they cannot possibly hold that official
accountable in any meaningful way for this action.").
126 Cf Staszewski, supra note 79, at 177-78 (pointing out that public choice theory suggests that an
agency's decisions not to take enforcement action may present "the ideal context for governmental officials to
favor narrow private interests over the public good to promote their own selfish interests, regardless of the
actual merits of a case").
127 For a discussion of the larger implications of this proposal for theories of legislative oversight, see
infra Part IV.E.
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officials and the public with valuable information about what agencies are
(not) doing.
The final major power and responsibility of the FIC would be to make
recommendations regarding budgetary matters and substantive legislation that
could address serious limitations on the ability of Executive Branch agencies to
take action to fulfill their statutory mandates. The most legitimate reasons that
agencies can offer for declining to take regulatory action include well-
considered decisions to allocate limited resources to more serious or easily
resolvable problems and determinations that certain courses of action would
exceed their statutory authority. The FIC would not be authorized to vacate or
second-guess administrative decisions of this nature that are consistent with the
available information under this proposal. Rather, the FIC would be expected
to join with conscientious agencies and regulatory beneficiaries to encourage
elected officials to provide the financial resources and legal authority needed to
solve difficult problems within each agency's programmatic responsibilities.
Public choice theory tells us that members of Congress like to take credit
while avoiding blame, which can be accomplished by enacting statutes that
create popular programs, while simultaneously depriving agencies of the legal
and financial resources that are needed to avoid regulatory capture and to
achieve their underlying policy goals. 128 To the extent this story is true, the
FIC would be well situated to draw attention to the failure of elected officials
to provide the continuing legal and financial support necessary for agencies to
successfully implement the public-regarding programs that have been entrusted
to their care, which continue to be popular with voters. 129 The FIC should
therefore not be viewed as inherently antagonistic to Executive Branch
agencies. Instead, its primary mission would be to promote good government
in the modem regulatory state.
128 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 496-97 (2003) ("[P]ublic choice theory hypothesizes that
Congress often writes statutes with few limitations on administrative discretion intentionally to create room for
interest groups to dominate the administrative process-all the while shifting blame to agencies for unpopular
outcomes and claiming credit with voters for superficial responses to public problems."). Bressman also
points out that "[p]ublic choice theory also posits, though less emphatically, that delegation allows agencies to
act in their own self-interest." Id. at 497. The FIC would, of course, be expected to help minimize this
pathology of agencies.
129 For a discussion of the political feasibility of this proposal, see infra Part IV.D.
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B. Why the FIC Provides a Win- Win- Win Solution
This section explains that the FIC would provide the same benefits that are
expected to result from judicial review of non-enforcement decisions and other
inaction by administrative agencies. At the same time, the FIC would be in a
position to minimize the practical disadvantages that have been identified with
judicial review of those decisions. Because the establishment of the FIC would
also provide a political solution to what the staunchest defenders of the status
quo have maintained is solely a political problem, this proposal should be
accepted as a viable solution from any perspective in the existing debate.
The benefits that would be provided by judicial review of agency inaction
could also be obtained by establishing an FIC with the foregoing powers and
responsibilities. First, the FIC would substantially reduce the incentives
generated by current legal doctrine for agencies to favor regulated entities over
regulatory beneficiaries in the administrative process. Specifically, agencies
would know that in contrast to the present situation, their non-enforcement
decisions and other inaction would stand a real chance of being discovered,
assessed, publicized, and invalidated. This scrutiny could even be initiated by
regulatory beneficiaries who would be authorized to file complaints with the
FIC about certain types of administrative inaction. The FIC would therefore
create incentives for Executive Branch agencies to pay close attention to the
interests and perspectives of regulatory beneficiaries throughout the
administrative process. These realigned incentives would, in turn, reduce the
likelihood that agencies will be captured by regulated entities and increase the
chances that regulation will serve the public good.
For related reasons, the FIC would also reduce the prevalence of arbitrary
decision making by agencies and improve the extent to which they comply
with existing legal mandates. First, the FIC's obligation to identify agency
inaction that violates existing legal mandates and to report its conclusions to
elected officials and the public would place increased pressure on agencies to
take the requisite action. The FIC's authority to identify new policy initiatives
that an agency could implement under its existing statutory authority and to
highlight these opportunities for elected officials and the public could have a
similar effect if Executive Branch agencies declined to pursue those initiatives
voluntarily. Second, the FIC's ability to direct Executive Branch agencies to
establish enforcement guidelines for their existing programs and to review the
validity of subsequent non-enforcement decisions would reduce arbitrary
decision making and promote compliance with the rule of law. Indeed, the
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FIC's authority to compel agencies to provide explanations for a variety of
inaction that would be subject to subsequent review would provide a host of
benefits that are associated with reason-giving of this nature. These benefits
include limiting the scope of available discretion; ensuring that responsible
public officials provide public-regarding justifications for their decisions;
facilitating transparency; and enabling interested parties to evaluate, discuss,
and criticize governmental action-and potentially to seek legal or political
reform. 13  Finally, the FIC's powers and responsibilities would improve the
chances that elected officials will enact legislation to redress an agency's
unwillingness or inability to take action that would achieve its broader policy
objectives and thereby promote the public good.
The preceding benefits could be viewed as largely instrumental, but the FIC
would also improve the democratic legitimacy of the modem regulatory state
on a more fundamental level. First, by counteracting the asymmetrical legal
treatment that is provided to regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, the
establishment of the FIC would recognize that the interests protected by
modem regulatory statutes are entitled to the same solicitude as the legal
interests that were protected by the common law and remain favored by courts
today. 131  Second, the FIC's ability to require agencies to provide reasoned
explanations for declining to take regulatory or enforcement action that could
reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally
competing perspectives would help to ensure the democratic legitimacy of
those decisions.
132
This is not to say that Executive Branch agencies must enforce existing
legal requirements against every violator or that agencies must implement their
statutory authority to the hilt. Nonetheless, several commentators have
recently emphasized, first, that fundamental principles of democratic and
130 See Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1279-84 (describing the benefits of reason-giving by public officials).
131 Cf Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 5, at 667-68 ("Regulatory interests, representing
public 'rights,' are created by congressional or administrative action and are entitled to judicial protection
under the APA." (footnote omitted)).
132 For prominent discussions of how reasoned deliberation establishes the democratic legitimacy of
governmental authority, see Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17
(Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL.
THEORY 338 (Elly Stein & Jane Mansbridge trans., 1987). See also Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) ("[F]ederal
administrative law should seek to promote popular representation in agency rulemaking through 'fiduciary
representation, [which] ...emphasizes agencies' responsibilities to act deliberatively and reasonably in
promoting the public welfare."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17 (1993) ("In American
constitutional law, government must always have a reason for what it does.").
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constitutional theory that underlie the administrative state make it problematic
for agencies to exercise broad statutory authority without sufficient constraints
and, second, that these principles apply when agencies decline to take action.
These commentators have essentially agreed that the key to legitimizing non-
enforcement decisions and other regulatory inaction is to require agencies to
provide reasoned explanations for their decisions. Thus, Lisa Bressman has
explained that reason-giving helps to ensure that the govermment advances
public purposes rather than narrow interests because "[w]hen agencies offer
open, public-regarding, and otherwise rational reasons, they reduce
opportunities for covert, private-interested, or otherwise arbitrary ones. 133
Moreover, Jerry Mashaw has argued that "in a polity where the individual is
the basic unit of social value, the fundamental reason for accepting law, or any
official decisionmaking, as legitimate, is that reasons can be given why those
subject to the law would affirm its content as serving recognizable collective
purposes."' 134 Finally, I have claimed that because "individual policy choices
are democratically legitimate to the extent that they are supported by public-
regarding explanations that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal
citizens with fundamentally different interests and perspectives," public
officials can be held democratically accountable "by a requirement or
expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions that meet
those criteria., 135  Significantly for present purposes, Professor Mashaw has
recognized that reason-giving can perform its fundamental legitimizing
functions even when it is not mandated or reviewed by the courts. 136  This
insight suggests that the FIC could substantially improve the democratic
legitimacy of the modern regulatory state by requiring Executive Branch
133 See Bressman, supra note 5, at 1687-94.
134 Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project
of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 99, 117-18 (2007). Mashaw acknowledges that
substantial disagreement will remain over which public policies are preferable and which decisions are
justified, but he explains:
[A] law or decision with which one disagrees can be recognized as acceptable or legitimate only
because it is explicable as a plausible instance of rational collective action. Reason giving thus
affirms the centrality of the individual in the democratic republic. It treats persons as rational
moral agents who are entitled to evaluate and participate in a dialog about official policies on the
basis of reasoned discussion. It affirms the individual as subject rather than object of law.
Id. at 118.
135 Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1255. See also id. at 1283 ("Reason-giving can therefore be understood as
the enforcement mechanism that holds public officials accountable for making legitimate policy choices in a
deliberative democracy.").
136 See Mashaw, supra note 134, at 122-23. See also Cuellar, supra note 106, at 227 (proposing certain
forms of auditing as an alternative to judicial review of exercises of executive discretion).
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agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their inaction that could be
accepted by regulated entities, regulatory beneficiaries, and other interested
parties.
The FIC would therefore be in a position to provide the same benefits as
judicial review of agency inaction. There are also reasons to believe that the
establishment of the FIC would be a major improvement upon previous
proposals to make judicial review more readily available. First, the FIC's
authority to review agency inaction would be far more comprehensive than the
judicial review that most other commentators have endorsed in this context.
Second, the FIC would be in an ideal position to minimize the practical
disadvantages that have been identified with judicial review of non-
enforcement decisions and other administrative inaction. In contrast to federal
courts, the FIC would not review the validity of non-enforcement decisions in
isolation. Rather, the FIC would be expressly responsible for investigating an
Executive Branch agency's resource limitations and evaluating its overall
policy choices and priorities along with its particular enforcement decisions in
light of that broader context. The FIC would therefore be in a better position
than courts to assess the validity of an agency's claim that resource limitations
justify refusing to take action. Not only would proceedings before the FIC be
less expensive than litigation, 137 but there is a good chance that the FIC's
complete understanding of this broader context would provide economies of
scale that would significantly streamline the costs associated with reviewing
non-enforcement decisions and other inaction. The FIC's potential use of
auditing techniques to review other non-enforcement decisions would also be
more cost-effective than case-by-case judicial review. 138 When problems are
discovered, however, the FIC would be empowered to invalidate and remand
agency decisions for further deliberation, which is precisely the remedy that
would normally be provided by the judiciary in a successful lawsuit of this
nature. Meanwhile, by placing the responsibility to investigate and review the
validity of agency inaction on the FIC rather than the courts, the federal
judiciary would not be burdened with additional litigation.
137 While reliable empirical data is not readily available, it is widely believed that informal proceedings
before administrative agencies are less expensive than adjudication in courts.
138 See Cu6llar, supra note 106, at 272 (explaining that although the precise costs of an audit system
depend on the details of its institutional design, "there is good reason to expect that those costs would be lower
than those associated with an expansion in the availability or stringency of traditional judicial review"); supra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the establishment of an agency like
the FIC, which is empowered to investigate and review agency inaction, would
almost completely avoid the separation of powers objections that are
frequently lodged against judicial review of such administrative decisions. As
explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has shielded certain types of regulatory
inaction from judicial review to prevent the judiciary from interfering with the
Executive Branch's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed., 139  The neoclassical model of administrative law, which is
exemplified by these decisions, seeks to preclude the judiciary from second-
guessing the policy decisions of the political branches. The FIC would be
established by the political branches based on a policy decision that this
agency would perform sufficiently valuable functions. The preceding concerns
would be entirely inapposite because the authority established by the FIC's
governing statute would neither be mandated nor carried out by the federal
judiciary. Rather, the neoclassical model would suggest that a policy decision
by the political branches to establish a new form of regulatory oversight of this
nature would be none of the judiciary's business. Moreover, as explained in
greater detail below, the delegation of this particular authority to the FIC does
not raise any serious constitutional difficulties because the FIC's powers and
responsibilities could already be carried out by Congress. Simply put, the FIC
would provide a political solution to what some judges and scholars have
maintained is solely a political problem. This proposal should therefore be
viewed as a viable solution to the problems that are presented by regulatory
inaction from any perspective in the existing debate.
IV. REMAINING QUESTIONS AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Part III of this Article described the most significant powers and
responsibilities of the FIC and explained the advantages of this proposal.
There are, however, still a few important questions that remain to be
considered. This Part examines (1) whether it would be preferable for
Congress to establish the FIC as a separate entity or whether its powers and
responsibilities should be assigned to existing entities, such as legislative
committees or the General Accountability Office (GAO); (2) how the
leadership of the FIC should be structured and what provisions should be made
for its appointment and removal; (3) whether the FIC's structure or powers and
responsibilities would pose any serious constitutional difficulties; (4) the likely
139 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see supra Part I; notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
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costs and political feasibility of establishing and operating the FIC; and (5) the
broader implications of this proposal for ongoing debates about the best
available strategies for overseeing the bureaucracy.
A. Who Should Carry Out This Work?
Thus far, this Article has assumed that the powers and responsibilities of
the FIC would be carried out by a new agency established by newly-enacted
legislation. This is, indeed, one way in which the FIC's anticipated work could
be authorized and carried out. The same work could, however, potentially be
carried out by existing entities, such as congressional committees or the GAO.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider which approach is preferable.
Each approach to reviewing agency inaction has advantages and
disadvantages. The primary advantages of standing congressional committees
performing these functions are that this approach could be implemented
without additional statutory authority; it would take advantage of existing
expertise; and it would be perceived as relatively legitimate. Congressional
committees and their staffs already have the capacity to (1) identify policy
areas in which administrative agencies within their jurisdictions have declined
to exercise their delegated statutory authority; (2) direct agencies to establish
sensible enforcement guidelines for existing programs; 14 (3) investigate and
assess complaints regarding particular non-enforcement decisions; 141 (4) secure
reasoned explanations from agency officials for any perceived deficiencies in
the foregoing areas; and (5) propose budget provisions and substantive
legislation that could alleviate any perceived deficiencies. Indeed,
congressional committees already perform these tasks periodically.
142
Moreover, the members of such committees already have, or will develop,
substantial expertise in the relevant subject areas, as well as extensive
140 Congress would, however, need to enact legislation to make such a directive legally binding.
141 Due process concerns could arise from congressional efforts to pressure agencies to undertake
enforcement action against specific regulated entities. Nonetheless, it would likely be permissible for
Congress to "vacate" particular non-enforcement decisions and "remand" those matters to agencies for
additional consideration, as long as it was clear that Executive Branch agencies retained authority over the
final determinations. See Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALl Decision Making
Independence with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADIN. L.
JuDGES 1 (2005); cf ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
congressional influence should not shape an agency's adjudication on the merits, but that mere "influence on
the decision to hold a hearing is unobjectionable").
142 See LEROY N. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS: THE EVOLVING LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 363-80
(2d ed. 1995) (describing congressional oversight of the Executive Branch's administration of the laws).
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knowledge about what the responsible agencies are (or are not) doing.143
Finally, this type of legislative oversight of Executive Branch agencies is
widely perceived as legitimate-and its potential existence is routinely offered
as a rationale for why judicial review of agency inaction should not be
available.
144
The main problem with this solution, however, is that the regular and
systematic oversight of agency inaction that is contemplated by this proposal is
not a high priority for most members of Congress. 145 Moreover, the legislative
oversight that typically occurs under the current system illustrates the
disadvantages of relying on congressional committees to carry out the
responsibilities of the FIC. First, legislative oversight often consists of
informal efforts by knowledgeable and well-placed members of Congress to
advance the narrow interests of powerful constituents behind the scenes, rather
than public investigations and reports on the merits of a broad range of
regulatory inactivity. 146  Given the insights of public choice theory and the
realities of congressional campaign financing, it is likely that this form of
oversight will often favor regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries.
147
Second, public hearings and oversight of agency inaction typically focus on
high visibility problems that resonate with voters (such as the response to
Hurricane Katrina) and will either be haphazard in nature or likely to be unduly
143 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 increased the available staffing for congressional
committees, which provided them with greater scientific and technical expertise. See generally MICHAEL
WELCH, AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (2008), available at
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/Cong-Cmte-Overview.pdf (discussing how events over the last
two centuries have affected the development of congressional committees).
144 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible
Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 429, 467 (1999) ("Political influence at
some level is imperative to justify the wide substantive latitude... needed for a workable administrative state.
The politically accountable branches must be able to ensure that the values underlying an agency's policies do
not deviate greatly from those generally held by the polity.").
145 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation
and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 311, 354 (2007) ("[C]ongressmen are busy and have intense
demands on their time, including the legislative process, meeting with lobbyists, raising money, and generating
press. Agency action is salient ... [whereas] agency inaction is boring and unlikely to land a member of
Congress on the evening news.").
146 See BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 59-85 (2d ed. 1989).
See also Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 61, 121-44 (2006)
(describing the wide range of informal congressional involvement in the execution of the laws).
147 See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 20, at 1284-92; supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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motivated by partisan political considerations. 148  Although political
considerations cannot be eliminated altogether from the oversight of Executive
Branch agencies, it would be preferable to delegate the power and
responsibility to conduct comprehensive evaluations of the validity of agency
inaction to a separate and independent body such as the FIC. Finally, since
elected officials have incentives to seek credit and to avoid blame, the
oversight that is conducted by congressional committees is relatively unlikely
to be objective when it comes to assessing the role played by lawmakers in
undermining the effective implementation of federal programs by Executive
Branch agencies. 149 An independent agency like the FIC would therefore be
better situated than a congressional committee to hold elected officials
responsible for failing to give administrative agencies sufficient financial
resources or legal authority to achieve the underlying goals of their statutory
mandates.
The GAO is another institution that could fulfill the role that has been
proposed for the FIC. The GAO already performs some of these functions
periodically under its existing statutory authority, which includes the ability to
seek information from federal agencies about their "duties, powers, activities,
organization, and financial transactions," as well as an obligation to evaluate
the results of the programs and activities that are carried out by the government
under existing law.150  For example, GAO has evaluated EPA's
implementation of the Superfund Program and discovered, among other things,
that EPA was failing to hold businesses sufficiently responsible for their
environmental cleanup obligations by (1) declining to implement a statutory
mandate that requires businesses that handle hazardous substances to make
financial assurances regarding their ability to pay for potential environmental
cleanups; (2) making little effort to ensure that businesses comply with EPA's
existing financial assurance requirements in cleanup agreements and orders;
and (3) foregoing opportunities to secure payments for cleanups from
financially distressed businesses that are available under EPA's existing
statutory authority. 15 The GAO made several recommendations based on
148 See ROSEN, supra note 146, at 67 ("Most committee and subcommittee hearings are not conducted on
a regularly scheduled basis .... Instead, they are held in response to public criticism of a law or its
administration, unexpected problems, [or] alleged improprieties .... ").
149 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 324-43 (1981) (discussing
the history and use of congressional oversight). There is, of course, some partisan squabbling about these
matters.
150 31 U.S.C. §§ 716-17 (2006).
151 See GAO, supra note 13.
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these findings, which were either adopted or are still being considered by
EPA.
152
In addition to having broad statutory authority to review and evaluate the
programs and activities of Executive Branch agencies and substantial
experience in carrying out these functions, GAO is widely regarded as an
efficient and effective organization that carries out its work on behalf of
Congress in a professional, independent, objective, and nonpartisan fashion.153
Actions taken by Congress and the Executive Branch in response to GAO's
recommendations reportedly resulted in over $22 billion in financial benefits
during 2006.154 Thus, based on the reforms that were implemented at GAO's
behest, every dollar that Congress appropriated for the agency's work saved
taxpayers $105.155 Moreover, Congress and the Executive Branch have
adopted more than eighty percent of GAO's recommendations in recent
years. 156 Based on GAO's existing statutory authority and broader mission,
157
as well as its admirable reputation, it might appear to be an ideal candidate to
perform the functions that have been proposed for the FIC.
Nonetheless, there would be several disadvantages to assigning these
functions to GAO. First, GAO would probably need additional statutory
authority to carry out all of the powers and responsibilities that have been
proposed for the FIC. Specifically, GAO does not appear to have the authority
to direct agencies to establish enforcement guidelines for their existing
programs. Moreover, while most agencies appear responsive to GAO's
152 See id. at 5-6.
153 See, e.g., GAO's Role in Supporting Congressional Oversight: An Overview of Past Work and Future
Challenges and Opportunities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter GAO's Role]; Anne Joseph O'Connell, Auditing Politics or Political
Auditing? (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 964656, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-964656 (reporting empirical results that support the theory that GAO is a
nonpartisan auditor facing some political constraints).
154 See GAO's Role, supra note 153, at 35.
155 See id. at 2.
156 See GAO, PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FIscAL YEAR 2009, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08507sp.pdf
157 See id. at 1 (reporting that GAO's mission is "to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government
for the benefit of the American people," and claiming that it accomplishes this mission "by providing reliable
information and informed analysis to the Congress, to federal agencies, and to the public" and by
recommending improvements, when appropriate, on a wide variety of issues); see also Cu6llar, supra note
106, at 296 ("[A]bout seventy-nine percent of recommendations made [by GAO] between October 6, 1989 and
February 3, 2005 were implemented, perhaps in part because of the potential media attention reports
generate.").
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inquiries, 158 it is not entirely clear that GAO can compel Executive Branch
agencies to provide reasoned explanations for declining to take regulatory
action. Finally, GAO does not have explicit statutory authority to invalidate
agency inaction or to remand those matters to agencies for further deliberation.
Accordingly, Congress would need to bolster GAO's existing statutory
authority to enable it to perform the full range of functions that have been
proposed for the FIC.159
Second, GAO might have more difficulty accomplishing the functions of
the FIC than a newly established agency because of its competing
responsibilities. GAO was initially created to conduct financial audits of
Executive Branch agencies, and it still devotes a substantial amount of its
resources to this important task. 16  Moreover, GAO is required by statute to
conduct oversight of agencies at the request of House and Senate leaders and
responsible congressional committees, and GAO gives these requests top
priority. 161 The concern is, therefore, that Congress might delegate additional
authority to GAO to carry out the powers and responsibilities of the FIC, but
GAO might fail to implement this authority in a sufficiently comprehensive
fashion based on its own resource constraints and competing
responsibilities. 162  The failure to implement the obligations of the Federal
Inaction Commission in an appropriate fashion would clearly be the worst
form of irony. It might therefore be preferable to give those responsibilities to
a separate agency that is created solely for this purpose-or perhaps to create a
separate division within GAO that is specifically responsible for carrying out
these functions.
158 The primary exception to this rule is the "intelligence community," which has historically resisted
GAO's oversight. See GAO's Role, supra note 153, at 18-19. See also Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51
(D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the Comptroller General lacked standing to initiate litigation to compel Vice
President Cheney to disclose documents relating to meetings of a national energy task force over which the
Vice President presided).
159 The potential constitutional difficulties that would arise from this course of action are discussed infra
at notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
160 See Cu6llar, supra note 106, at 304-05 (explaining that this function is central to the cultural identity
of existing auditing institutions, including GAO).
161 See 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(2)-(3) (2006); GAO's Role, supra note 153, at 12 (describing the increased
number of requests from members of Congress for action by GAO and explaining that the agency only has the
resources to complete requests from the chair or ranking member of a committee or subcommittee with
jurisdiction over a matter).
162 Congress has reduced GAO's budget over the past decade despite its demonstrated cost-effectiveness.
See GAO's Role, supra note 153, at 10-12.
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The advantages and disadvantages of establishing a new agency to carry
out the powers and responsibilities of the FIC should be readily apparent from
the preceding discussion. The need for Congress to enact new legislation to
establish the FIC could be viewed as both a blessing and a curse. On one hand,
lawmakers would be able to "customize" the FIC's enabling act to provide it
with all of the powers and responsibilities that are described above, in addition
to an appropriate organizational structure and sensible provisions for the
appointment and removal of its leadership. On the other hand, it would be
fairly difficult-though, as discussed below, not impossible-to build the
political consensus necessary to adopt an enabling act of this nature. As
already discussed, however, it would also be advantageous to establish a new,
independent federal agency with the sole mission of conducting a
comprehensive and nonpartisan evaluation of regulatory inaction by Executive
Branch agencies. All things considered, the best course of action would either
be to establish a new federal agency to carry out the work of the FIC or to
create a new division of GAO (which already has an impressive track record)
with this specific mission.
B. How Should the FIC's Leadership Be Structured?
A second question that needs to be considered is the appropriate structure
of the leadership of the FIC and the provisions that should be made for its
appointment and removal. While there are a variety of possibilities, 163 GAO's
enabling act provides a useful model regardless of whether the FIC is
incorporated into that agency or established as a separate entity. The GAO is
headed by the Comptroller General, who is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for a single fifteen-year term. 164 The President selects
the Comptroller General from a list of three or more candidates who are
recommended by a commission composed of congressional leaders from both
major political parties and the chairs and ranking minority members of the
committees in Congress with greatest oversight responsibilities. 16' The
Comptroller General may only be removed from office by impeachment or for
specified causes by a joint resolution of Congress after notice and an
163 See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. RaV. 1111, 1137-38 (2000) (identifying several independent
agencies and describing their different organizational structures).
164 See 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1), (b) (2006).
165 See id. § 703(a)(2)-(3).
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opportunity to be heard. 166 The latter method of removal requires presidential
approval or an affirmative vote by a two-thirds majority of both legislative
chambers to override a presidential veto.
167
The head of the FIC, let us call her the "Initiator General," could be
appointed in the same manner and given similar job security as the
Comptroller General. This approach would ensure that the person chosen to
head the agency is acceptable to the President, Congress, and leaders of both
political parties. Once in office, the Initiator General would have substantial
independence to perform her job in an objective and nonpartisan fashion
because she could only be removed from office if there was an unusually broad
consensus that sufficient cause existed.168  These features of the legislative
scheme have undoubtedly contributed to GAO's professional reputation and
ability to hold Executive Branch agencies accountable for their performance,
169
and similar mechanisms for selecting and retaining the FIC's leadership should
be adopted.
One potential deviation from this scheme that should be considered would
be to make the Initiator General subject to removal by the President for
specified causes. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court held that it was an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers for the Comptroller
General to perform certain executive functions because he was subject to
removal by Congress. 17  The Court therefore invalidated the reporting
provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985, which
authorized the Comptroller General to direct the President to make specified
spending reductions in particular circumstances. 171  The Court appeared to
define the "executive functions" that the Comptroller General was precluded
166 See id. § 703(e)(1).
167 See Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728 n.7 (1986).
168 In the more than eighty-year history of GAO, there have only been seven comptrollers general. See
GAO, GAO: Working for Good Government Since 1921, http://www.gao.gov/about/history/goodgov.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2009). Proceedings have never been initiated to impeach or remove a comptroller
general. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the validity of the removal
power, which has never been exercised and had been all but forgotten).
169 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
170 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 ("Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.").
171 Id. at 734.
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from performing quite broadly, 172 but it simultaneously emphasized that the
challenged reporting provisions authorized the Comptroller General to
command "the President himself to carry out, without the slightest
variation . . . the directive of the Comptroller General as to the budget
reductions. 173 Because it was most likely the Comptroller General's ultimate
authority to order the President to make specific budget cuts that really
bothered a majority of the Court, 17 4 the powers and responsibilities of the FIC
would be distinguishable on the grounds that the Initiator General would not be
authorized to order Executive Branch agencies (much less the President) to
take any affirmative action. 175  Nonetheless, it would be safer as a
constitutional matter if the head of the FIC were subject to removal for good
cause by the President, since removal provisions of this nature were explicitly
distinguished by the Bowsher Court. 176 For the same reason, it may be safer as
a constitutional matter for Congress to establish the FIC as a new Article II
agency, rather than as a division of an Article I agency such as GAO.
Regardless of whether the FIC is established as a division of GAO or an
independent agency, and whether its head is subject to removal for good cause
by Congress or the President, there may still be some concerns about the
potential politicization of the FIC and where its sympathies would lie. On one
hand, these concerns would be minimized by the fact that the FIC would not be
empowered to order agencies to "do" anything (other than reconsider their
decisions not to take action). On the other hand, the FIC would almost
certainly be a thorn in the side of an administration that chose not to implement
172 As the Court put it:
Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence
of "execution" of the law. Under § 251, the Comptroller General must exercise judgment
concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must also interpret the provisions of
the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that kind
are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.
Id. at 733.
173 id.
174 See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1986, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 117, 117-25
(1987) (discussing the limited nature of the Bowsher holding, particularly the Court's affirmation of the
constitutionality of independent agencies).
175 See supra Part III.A (discussing the six powers and responsibilities of the proposed Federal Inaction
Commission).
176 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 724-26 (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) and
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), to support the proposition that the President may be subject to a
good cause requirement in order to remove an executive officer). Similarly, if the new agency is established as
a division of GAO, it would likely avoid some potential constitutional difficulties if the final decision-making
authority of the FIC were granted to the Initiator General, rather than the Comptroller General.
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its statutory mandates for questionable reasons. It is therefore possible that the
FIC's role would be as controversial as the regulatory review conducted by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Indeed, I originally
envisioned the FIC as an advocate for regulatory beneficiaries who would
otherwise be underrepresented in the administrative process, and I therefore
anticipated that the agency would serve as a counterweight to the influence of
OIRA. The need for a counterweight is likely to diminish to some extent in the
current Obama Administration, with Cass Sunstein as the head of OIRA, but
the current political leadership would not render the FIC superfluous. Rather,
a relatively pro-regulatory administration would presumably appreciate the
information provided by the FIC and view this agency as a cooperative partner
in its effort to facilitate effective government and reasoned decision making.
Rather than worrying about the FIC conducting oversight in an overly-
aggressive manner, a more significant concern would arise if the agency failed
to implement its statutory mandate in a sufficiently rigorous fashion. The best
way to prevent either of these possibilities from materializing, however, would
be to appoint the right people to lead the agency. The ideal candidates would
be sophisticated students of the modem administrative state who believe in the
capacity of regulation to promote the public good. The likelihood of
appointing and confirming those candidates would be facilitated by requiring
the President to choose from among a small group of individuals recommended
by a bipartisan commission, thereby giving both major political parties a
meaningful say in the appointment process.
C. Would the FIC Raise Constitutional Difficulties?
Even if the FIC is headed by an Initiator General who is appointed by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, and subject to removal by the President for
specified reasons, the constitutional validity of the agency could still
potentially be called into question. The basic arguments would be that
restrictions on the President's removal authority and the powers and
responsibilities of the FIC as a whole interfere with the President's
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws, in violation of the separation
of powers.
Such a case would be similar to Morrison v. Olson,177 and it should be
decided in the same way. Morrison held that for-cause limitations on the
177 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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President's ability to remove independent counsels who were authorized to
investigate and prosecute alleged crimes by high-level Executive Branch
officials did not unduly trammel on executive authority in violation of the
separation of powers. 178 If such limitations can be placed on the President's
ability to remove prosecutors who are responsible for sending high-level
Executive Branch officials to jail, the same conclusion would presumably
follow for administrators who are merely authorized to investigate and review
the inaction of Executive Branch agencies. Morrison also held that the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act did not
impermissibly undermine the powers of the Executive Branch or prevent the
President from performing his constitutionally assigned functions.
179
Similarly, the oversight responsibilities that have been proposed for the FIC
would not unduly interfere with the President's constitutional duty faithfully to
execute the laws for several reasons. First, the Court has already recognized
that the presumption against judicial review of non-enforcement decisions is
defeasible by Congress. 18  If Congress can authorize judicial review of non-
enforcement decisions by statute, it should also be allowed to enact a statute
that delegates the authority to review non-enforcement decisions to an
independent agency that is created for this purpose. Second, Congress is
plainly allowed to identify policy areas in which Executive Branch agencies
have declined to exercise their statutory authority, require them to adopt
enforcement guidelines for their existing programs, and secure reasoned
explanations from agency officials for perceived deficiencies in the foregoing
areas. There is no reason to believe that it would be impermissible for
Congress to enact a statute that delegates these responsibilities to the FIC.
The Court has periodically suggested that judicial review of generalized
grievances violates the separation of powers by interfering with the President's
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws-and that Congress may not
178 Id. at 691. See also Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 602 (finding that the restriction of the President's
removal power to a list of causes is constitutional); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 349 (finding the President's removal of
a War Claims Commission member wrongful where Congress defined the scope of member tenure but made
no provision for removal).
179 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96.
180 The presumption against judicial review can be overcome by the enactment of a statute that creates
"law to apply," which, in turn, could be used to assess the legality of non-enforcement decisions. See Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834-35 (1985) (discussing Congress's ability to indicate intent to circumscribe
agency enforcement discretion through "law to apply"). Because the FIC would be authorized to compel
administrative agencies to promulgate reasonable enforcement guidelines for their existing programs, the FIC
would routinely have law to apply when it reviews non-enforcement decisions under this proposal.
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circumvent these limitations on the judiciary's authority. 181 Nonetheless, the
underlying premise of these decisions is that the general manner in which the
Executive Branch implements the law is properly subject to review by the
political branches. Because the political review that allegedly renders judicial
review unnecessary and inappropriate in this context necessarily includes
congressional oversight, it is once again difficult to see why the legislature
would be prohibited from enacting a statute that delegates its oversight
responsibilities to an agency like the FIC.
The functions of the FIC that would be most vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge of this nature are its ability to "vacate" an agency's non-enforcement
decisions and other inaction and "remand" those decisions to the agency for
further deliberations. Yet, this authority would also be permissible based on
the same reasoning that is set forth in the preceding paragraph. Congress can
typically compel agency officials to testify regarding the manner in which they
implement their statutory authority. 182 If Congress is dissatisfied with their
explanations, it can ordinarily instruct agency officials to engage in further
deliberations on specified policy issues and to consider alternative courses of
action. This is, in effect, all that Congress would be authorizing the FIC to do
under this proposal. Because the FIC would not be empowered to order
Executive Branch agencies to take any affirmative action, it would not be
interfering with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws in violation of the separation of powers. On the contrary, the whole point
of establishing the FIC is to increase the likelihood that this duty will be
fulfilled.
D. Is This Proposal Cost-Effective and Politically Feasible?
The FIC's proposed role would not pose overwhelming constitutional
difficulties, but one might still object to the potential costs of the proposal or
question its political feasibility. Although the precise costs of establishing and
operating the FIC are difficult to predict, there is little question that the
implementation of this proposal would be a significant undertaking. The
requisite costs would include the salaries of the FIC's employees and the
agency's operating costs and overhead. For purposes of comparison, it is
181 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-77 (1992) (holding that Congress may not
provide a "procedural right" to standing without a concrete injury).
182 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GoVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY TIEY Do IT
235-36 (1989) (describing the "awesome arsenal" of weapons that Congress can use to control agencies).
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worth noting that GAO had 3,152 employees and a budget of $486 million in
2007.183 It seems unlikely that the FIC would exceed these figures, but if it
turns out that investigating and reviewing the inaction of every Executive
Branch agency would be unnecessary or cost-prohibitive, Congress could
certainly instruct the FIC to focus on specific agencies with statutory mandates
that most directly affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Moreover, the
FIC's use of auditing techniques to review non-enforcement decisions would
allow the agency to learn a great deal about the Executive Branch's
performance in an efficient manner.184  While an annual budget in the
neighborhood of several hundred million dollars is a lot of money, the federal
government reportedly paid almost $400 billion in interest on the national debt
in fiscal year 2006, and the war in Iraq has reportedly cost American taxpayers
over $700 billion since 2001.185 Considering the returns on those investments,
the work of the FIC would be nothing short of a bargain.
The FIC's work under this proposal would also impose additional costs on
Executive Branch agencies that would need to be considered. First,
administrative agencies would be required to provide the FIC with information
about the implementation of their delegated authority. Second, the FIC could
direct them to adopt reasonable enforcement guidelines for their existing
programs. Third, the FIC would be empowered to require agencies to give
reasoned explanations for refusing to take certain action, and it could vacate
and remand non-enforcement decisions and other inaction for further
deliberations. Finally, Congress might amend an agency's enabling act or
increase its budget in response to recommendations from the FIC. Each of the
foregoing actions could cost the federal government additional money.
At the same time, the costs that Executive Branch agencies would incur as
a result of the FIC should not be overstated. Many of the FIC's functions
could already be performed by congressional committees or the GAO, which
means that any increase in spending by administrative agencies would be the
result of more comprehensive oversight rather than the creation of a new
oversight body. Moreover, the costs that would be imposed on Executive
Branch agencies by the FIC would be limited by the fact that the FIC would
not be empowered to order them to take any affirmative action. There are also
183 GAO, supra note 156, at 4.
184 See supra notes 116-19, 138 and accompanying text.
185 See Nat'l Priorities Project, Where Do Your Tax Dollars Go? Notes and Sources (2007), http://www.
nationalpriorities.org/node/5771 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
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some circumstances in which the FIC could save the federal government
money. First, the FIC could prompt administrative agencies to take action
under existing statutory mandates that would provide financial benefits to the
federal government. The GAO's study of EPA's failure to implement aspects
of the Superfund Program provides a good example of this phenomenon.
186
Second, the FIC could recommend the elimination of existing statutory
mandates that are found to be unrealistic, unnecessary, or counterproductive
based on its investigation and review of the inaction of the agencies
responsible for implementing those provisions. Under those circumstances, the
FIC could be viewed as an ally of Executive Branch agencies that are seeking
relief from ineffectual or unduly burdensome statutory requirements.
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the establishment and operation of
the FIC would admittedly impose some additional costs on Executive Branch
agencies.
One's views on whether these additional costs are justified will depend, to
a certain extent, on whether one sees a problem with the existing state of
affairs. In comparison to the status quo, the proposal to establish and operate
the FIC would clearly result in some additional federal spending. As explained
above, however, this proposal would be cost-effective in comparison to
previous proposals to increase the availability of judicial review of agency
inaction. 187 Moreover, the establishment and operation of the FIC would not
depend upon deeply contested views of the judiciary's proper role in our
constitutional democracy. The adoption of this proposal would, however, be
premised upon a general belief that it is problematic as a policy matter for
regulated entities to be given preferential treatment over regulatory
beneficiaries in the administrative process. The proposal is also more likely to
appeal to those who believe that requiring public officials to give reasoned
explanations for their decisions provides a crucial mechanism for holding them
accountable for the exercise of their authority and for improving the
democratic legitimacy of policy choices. 189 Finally, the proposal is premised
186 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. For example, even though elections cost a great deal
of money, almost no one questions whether they are warranted on financial grounds because they are viewed
as an essential element of democracy. I would contend that reason-giving deserves a similarly fundamental
status in a democracy. See Staszewski, supra note 8, at 1286 (claiming that "a requirement or expectation that
public officials will provide a reasoned explanation for their decisions should be understood as a defining
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on a fundamental belief that it is possible for administrative agencies to
implement federal programs in the modem regulatory state in a thoughtful
manner that promotes the public good. If one rejects these premises based on a
belief that regulation necessarily reflects rent-seeking by narrow selfish
interests, 190 then the best we can do may be to limit the costs (and, hence, the
damage) that can be imposed on society by our public institutions. 191
Conversely, if one believes that it is possible for regulation to serve the public
interest and that institutional structures can be designed to facilitate (or inhibit)
this result,192 then the adoption of innovative proposals, like the establishment
of the FIC, to improve the status quo would definitely be worth a shot.
Because empirical reality generally falls in between these competing views
of regulation,193 the political feasibility of the FIC will likely depend on
whether a sufficiently broad coalition of elected representatives can be formed
who either believe that the proposed work of the FIC is normatively desirable
or that it is in their self-interest to support regulatory reform of this nature. If
the obstacles that might be posed by the federal budget deficit and economic
recession can be overcome, the current political climate is almost certainly as
conducive to the establishment of the FIC as it will ever be. Although
Executive Branch officials would ordinarily have rational incentives to oppose
increased oversight of this nature, 19  President Obama has expressed a firm
commitment to resisting pressure from organized special interests. 195 Not only
feature of republican democracy, at least as important as periodic elections, because it forces public officials to
treat citizens who are bound by their decisions with the proper degree of respect").
190 See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality: Or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 109-10 (2000) (describing public choice theory as "the most powerful of
our contemporary creation myths" in administrative law and explaining that it "posits the innate depravity or
corruption in all regulatory programs").
191 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1039,
1044 (1997) (explaining that contemporary trends in administrative law reflect the influence of public choice
theory and are "a product of a deeper and more generalized pessimism about the administrative state, and in
particular, of a spreading disenchantment with all forms of activist government").
192 See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7 (2000) (describing the
conditions and motives necessary to promote broad-based public interests against the opposition of more
concentrated and powerful interests).
193 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1017 n.72 (2006) (discussing the
relevant literature and concluding that "the empirical evidence suggests that participants in the legislative
process display a combination of self-interested, ideological, and altruistic motivations").
194 See Cuellar, supra note 106, at 300 ("[O]ther things being equal, executive authorities and their allies
should be expected to seek more discretion, and less review.").
195 See Organizing on the Issues, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/#free-executive (last visited
July 30, 2009) (describing President Obama's plan to change Washington by freeing the Executive Branch
from special interest influence).
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could he demonstrate this commitment by signing the FIC's enabling act into
law and thereby ensuring that the voices of regulatory beneficiaries can be
heard, but the FIC's oversight responsibilities could ultimately demonstrate his
Administration's competence and professionalism. 196  Moreover, the FIC's
governing statute would clearly have the best chance of being enacted by a
Democratic President and Congress because its raison d'etre reflects the
endorsement of a relatively active regulatory state. Finally, the minority
opposition to this proposal in the Senate would likely be muted by the fact that
the country is still emerging from the reign of an extremely unpopular
President who was widely perceived to have abused executive power, partly
through the inaction of Executive Branch agencies. 197  Thus, while the
problems of democratic governance that are addressed by this Article are
timeless, this proposal to establish the FIC is also very timely based on the
existing political environment.
There are, of course, no guarantees that the FIC would continue to receive
the requisite political support in perpetuity once established, but there is a good
chance that path-dependence, the norm of divided government, and the
benefits that the agency would provide to elected officials and the public
would combine to provide the FIC with a reasonably bright future if this
proposal turns out to be a success. 198 While its formal independence from the
political process would help, the FIC's ability to thrive in the long-run may
ultimately depend on its ability to convince elected officials and the public that
its autonomy should be protected.199 This goal would be facilitated by the
agency's development of a reputation for technical competence and
impartiality.
20 0
196 See Cullar, supra note 106, at 300 (recognizing that Executive Branch officials could "have reason to
limit their flexibility in order to demonstrate their competence"). Cf Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("As long as the government has a good reason for its actions it need not
fear disclosure. It is only where the government acts improperly that [a reason-giving requirement] is truly
burdensome.").
197 See, e.g., BUZBEE ET AL., supra note 13; Phillip J. Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory
Judgments: The President as Judge, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 253 (2007).
198 It is considered a truism of public administration that government agencies, once established and
entrenched, become self-perpetuating. See generally RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
DEMOCRACY (1985).
199 See Cuellar, supra note 106, at 306-08. See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGiNG OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2001).
200 See Cu~llar, supra note 106, at 307-08.
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E. Broader Implications for Oversight
Not only are the political challenges that would be faced by this proposal
potentially surmountable, but the successful enactment and operation of the
FIC would change the nature of legislative oversight of administrative agencies
in highly desirable ways. Since Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
published their path-breaking article on the subject,20 1 scholars have
distinguished between "police patrol oversight" and Congress's use of "fire
alarms" to monitor the performance of regulatory agencies. As McCubbins
and Schwartz explain, "police-patrol oversight is comparatively centralized,
active, and direct: at its own initiative, Congress examines a sample of
executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any
violation of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such
activities. 20 2 In contrast, fire alarm oversight relies on interest groups and the
attentive public to use the procedures established by Congress to learn what
agencies are doing and to bring politically salient problems to the attention of
203legislators. McCubbins and Schwartz claim that legislators have powerful
incentives to prefer fire alarm oversight because it maximizes the political
204
return on their limited resources. In other words, fire alarm oversight allows
members of Congress to earn political credit by helping organized constituents
with their problems without wasting time on the review of Executive Branch
activities that have not raised sufficient concerns.
The fundamental problem with fire alarm oversight, however, is that it
ignores arbitrary decision making by Executive Branch agencies that escapes
the attention of well-organized interest groups.20 5 Numerous commentators
have therefore suggested that an increase in police-patrol oversight would be
206beneficial. Yet, positive political theory has persuasively suggested that
members of Congress generally do not have sufficient incentives to devote
201 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 165 (1984).
202 Id. at 166.
203 See id.; Cuellar, supra note 106, at 297-98 (describing this model).
204 McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 201, at 167-68.
205 See Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of
Regulatory Agencies, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196, 199 (1996) ("[A]symmetric fire-alarm signals give rise to
asymmetric political control rules that introduce a bias into political decision making.").
206 See, e.g., JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT 97-104 (1990).
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their own limited resources to this endeavor.207 That does not mean, however,
that they would necessarily be unwilling to delegate the authority to perform
more comprehensive oversight to an independent agency established for this
purpose. 208  The FIC's mission could easily be understood and justified in
precisely this fashion. Even if it was normatively desirable for Congress to
rely exclusively on fire alarm oversight, this approach does not effectively
identify and redress arbitrary agency inaction. First, the collective action
problems that have been identified by public choice theory suggest that the
beneficiaries of modem social welfare legislation will have greater difficulty
monitoring and challenging the decisions of Executive Branch agencies than
regulated entities even if they are given similar procedural opportunities.
209
Second, the normal mechanisms for organized groups and interested members
of the public to sound an alarm are missing in this context because agency
inaction is often exempt from the procedural requirements of the APA and
immune from judicial review. 21  One could respond that this state of affairs is
what self-interested members of Congress would have intended, 211 but that is
precisely what needs to change if oversight of the modem bureaucracy is going
to be effective. The enactment and operation of the FIC would ensure that the
interests of regulatory beneficiaries are represented in the administrative
process and that arbitrary agency inaction is brought to the attention of
Congress and interested members of the public in a sufficiently ringing
fashion.
CONCLUSION
Administrative agencies can implement their delegated statutory authority
too aggressively or not aggressively enough. When regulated entities are
adversely affected by final agency action, they can routinely obtain judicial
review of the legality of those agency decisions. This important safeguard and
207 See McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive
and Administrative Agencies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNoMics 1654, 1706 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Stephen Shavell eds., 2007) ("[P]olitical leaders are likely to prefer the low-risk, high-reward strategy of fire-
alarm oversight to the more risky and costly police-patrol system.").
208 Indeed, the establishment of the GAO in 1921 demonstrates the potential willingness of Congress to
provide for relatively comprehensive oversight of federal agencies. See generally RICHARD E. BROWN, THE
GAO: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1970).
209 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
210 See Bressman, supra note 124, at 1769-70 ("Judicial review is necessary for [fire-alarm oversight] to
work because courts force agencies to comply with the procedures that facilitate fire-alarm oversight.").
211 See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 201.
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other procedural protections are often unavailable to regulatory beneficiaries
who are adversely affected by agency inaction. As a result, agencies have
powerful incentives to favor the views of regulated entities over the views of
regulatory beneficiaries during the administrative process. While a number of
commentators have suggested that judicial review of non-enforcement
decisions and other agency inaction should be more readily available to
alleviate this asymmetry and advance other important objectives, such
proposals arguably raise separation of powers concerns and other practical
difficulties stemming from the limited resources of agencies and courts and
questions regarding the judiciary's competence to review decisions of this
nature.
This Article has proposed the establishment of the Federal Inaction
Commission. This new, independent agency would be charged with
investigating and reviewing the inaction of Executive Branch agencies and
reporting its findings and recommendations to elected officials and the public.
The FIC would provide many of the same benefits that are expected to result
from judicial review of non-enforcement decisions and other inaction by
administrative agencies. Thus, in addition to compelling Executive Branch
agencies to consider new initiatives and adopt enforcement guidelines for their
existing programs, the FIC would ensure that those agencies provide reasoned
explanations for particular non-enforcement decisions and other inaction. This
obligation would, in turn, compel Executive Branch agencies to consider all of
the relevant interests and perspectives during their decision-making process, in
addition to preventing arbitrary governmental action and securing a meaningful
form of democratic accountability. At the same time, the FIC would be in a
position to minimize the practical disadvantages that have been identified with
judicial review of agency inaction. The establishment of the FIC would
therefore provide a workable solution to the problems presented by agency
inaction without raising any serious constitutional difficulties. This proposal
would vastly improve the oversight of administrative agencies by bringing a
broader range of arbitrary or otherwise unlawful decision making to the
attention of elected officials and the public.
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